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ASPECTS OF PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION AND THE
1942 REVENUE REVISION
EXACTED after more than seven months of sharp controversy, the Revenue
Revision of 1942 ' is significant for the basic changes it makes in the tax frame-
work and for the numerous measures which, though not adopted, were
discussed during its preparation. Under the Revision a levy approximating a
tax on gross income has been introduced into the federal tax system 2 for
the first time. And, after a long absence, the principle of withholding at the
source has been reintroduced 3 on a relatively large scale in an attempt to place
the taxpayer on a current basis.4 A suggestion made by Beardsley Runl
1. Pub. L. No. 753, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 21, 1942), (hereafter cited as Pub.
L. No. 753) was first considered by the House Ways and Means Committee #n March
3, 1942.
2. Pub. L. No. 753, § 172 (Subchapter D-Victory Tax on Individuals). See dis-
cussion infra at 364-65.
3. Pub. L. No. 753, § 172 (Part II-Collecton of Tax at Source on Wages). See
discussion infra at 368.
4. Also enacted was a radical departure in taxing mutual and corporate insur-
ance companies. Pub. L. No. 753, §§ 163-65. Also revised is the met d in which pension
trusts are to be taxed. Pub. L. No. 753, § 162, cf. § 137. In addition, a significant change
in capital gains taxation has been enacted. Pub. L. No. 753, § 150. Not inconsequential are
the changes made in the individual and corporate tax rate structure. The normal tax on in-
dividuals was increased from 4% to 6%, Pub. L. No. 753, § 102, while the surtax range was
355
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52: 355
that the 1942 tax obligation be waived and the nation placed on a virtually
"pay-as-you-go" basis r was not adopted, despite the favorable comment accord-
ed it. Similarly rejected- despite vigorous support, were the various pro-
posals for a general sales levy.7 A-s an alternative, the Treasury unsuccessfully
urged the adoption of a "spendings tax," 8 designed to avoid the regressive
impact of the sales tax and yet to achieve the salutary effects of that levy by
acting as a deterrent to spending and as a revenue raising device. Also pro-
posed and rejected were provisions to minimize tax privilege by imposing a
tax upon the interest from government bonds 0 and making mandatory a joint
return for husband and wife.' 0
raised from 6%-77% to 13%-82%, with the highest surtax rate now applicable to surtax
net income over $200,000 whereas tile highest surtax rate was formerly imposed on surtax
net income over $5,000,000. Pub. L. No. 753, § 103. Corporation surtaxes were raised
from 6% to 10% on surtax net income not over $25,000. On surtax net income from
$25,000 to $50,000 the surtax imposed was raised from 6% to a flat $2,500 levy plus 22% of
the surtax net income above $25,000. The tax on surtax net income over $50,000 was
raised from 7% to 16%. Pub. L. No. 753, § 105. Corporate normal tax levies remained
substantially the same. Ibid. Corporate excess profits taxation, formerly on a graduated
base of from 35% to 60%, now imposes a flat 90% levy after a $5,000 exemption, Pub. L.
No. 753, § 202. Nevertheless provision has been made for a post-war refund, of 10%, of
the excess profits levy. Pub. L. No. 753, § 250.
5. See RUML, THE PAY-As-You-Go INcO-ME TAX PL.AN (revised Nov. 16, 1942) 3;
Hearings before Committee on Finance on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 175
(hereafter cited as Senate Hearings).
6. See, e.g., the editorial policy of the New York Times, passim.
7. A 10% general sales tax, with food excepted, was urged by Senator Taft, N. Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1942, p. 1, col. 4. The variant proposed by Senator Byrd placed a "5%
tax on food, clothing, medicine, and other necessities, rising to 8% on all other" commo-
dities. N. Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1942, p. 1, col. 3. The controversy as to whether a manu-
facturers, wholesalers, or retail sales tax was most desirable [see Hearings before Con-
mittee on Ways and Means on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 345-50], (here-
after cited as House Hearings) was settled by the 0. P. A. statement that a manufac-
turers and wholesalers sales tax would enormously complicate the job of determining
and policing the various price ceilings. For similar reasons the proposal to tax "all turn-
over the nation in the form of a pyramided sales tax" [Haensel, Turnover Sales Tax
(1942) 20 TAxEs 264] is excluded from present consideration.
Although a general sales levy is now imposed by 22 states, a general sales tax has
never been adopted by the Federal Government. See House Hearings at 354. Yet note the
varying importance of the tariff in the federal tax system. And extensive use is made in
the 1942 Act of the excise tax in an attempt to raise revenue and discourage consump-
tion of certain commodities. Pub. L. No. 753, title VI.
8. Advocated on Sept. 3, 1942, six months after the start of the debate on the bill.
See statement of Randolph E. Paul before the Senate Finance Committee in Executive
Session, Treas. Dep't Release, unlisted, Sept. 3, 1942. Some indication, however, that
such a scheme Was contemplated earlier may be found in a memorandum submitted to the
House Ways and Means Committee on June 27, 1942. Senate Hearings at 2164.
9. See House Hearings at 8.
10. See House Hearings at 9.
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The extended debate and the rather sweeping nature of the changes made
and proposed were the almost inevitable result of the intended scope of tile
1942 Act, the breadth of which is indicated in a statement made by Secretary
Morgenthau when the measure was first considered:
"Our task is more than the raising of a huge amount of new rev-
enue. .... It is to frame the new revenue act so wiselv and so sound-
ly that it will facilitate the maximum production of war materials,
hasten the mobilization of our resources, strengthen the unity of our
people for the waging of total war, and prepare us for the new eco-
nomic and social problems that will face us when the war is won." n
More concretely, the objectives of a wartime tax program are: (1) the rais-
ing of revenue on a scale large enough to meet war expenditures 12 to a sub-
stantial degree; (2) the reduction, in some measure, of the variously estimated
inflationary gap resulting from the demand of a greatly increased national
income against the steadily decreasing production of consumer's goods ;a
(3) what is implicit in the foregoing-some assistance in the conversion of an
economy producing consumer goods to one in which virtually all facilities
are fully utilized for war production; and (4) an equitable allocation of the
costs of war.
In order to attain these ends, tax rates must be sharply increased 14 and
the tax structure broadened so as to reach many who in the past have not
been directly affected by taxation. By this action a greater revenue fund will
necessarily be created, and the funds ordinarily utilized in civilian consump-
tion will be diminished, thereby assisting the process of conversion. Subsist-
ence taxation through higher tax rates and a l)roadened tax structure is tile
11. House Hearings at 2.
12. Seventy-eight billions were required for the fiscal year 1942 by the estimate of
Oct. 3, 1942. At the same time non-war expenditures for the same period were estimated
at $6,044 million. Bureau of the Budget Release No. OD4, Oct. 7. 1942, at 1. "The total
war program, including government corporations, as reflected by war appropriations and
net authorizations enacted since June 1940 and those now pending before the Congress,
amounts to $230 billion. . . ." Ibid. "The President requested additional revenue of
$7 billion for the fiscal year 1943. While the yield under revenue bills now pending in
Congress has been estimated at between $6.3 billion and $8 billion for a full year of opera-
tion, only $4 billion of this would come in the fiscal year 1943 if the bill is enacted before
November 1." Id. at 2. The Revenue Revision of 1942, as enacted, Oct. 21, 1942, compels
no substantial alteration in these calculations. The necessity fur additional funds is fur-
ther demonstrated by President Roosevelt's budget message of Jan. 11, 1942, in which
$16 billion in new taxes and/or compulsory savings was asked in connection with pros-
pective expenditures of $108,903,047,923. N. Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1943, p. 1, col. 8.
13. As late as Aug. 25, 1942, it was stated that national income in 1942 will reach
a total of $113 billion, while our production of goods and services for civilian use will
total no more than $75 billion. A deduction of $29 billion from that income fur taxes
and savings will leave about $84 billion to compete for only 175 billion in consumer
goods. Victory (Office of War Information publication), Aug. 25, 1942, p. 5, col. 2.
14. See discussion concerning such increase in note 4 sutpra.
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obvious, though crude, method of effecting the purposes hitherto mentioned.
It involves directly taxing away not only all savings, but also some part of
funds previously expended for non-essentials. More refined methods of taxa-
tion, however, are those which by the manner of their imposition achieve
substantially the same ends as subsistence taxation without its tremendously
harmful impact upon the nation's morale and economy.
TuE SALES TAX
One such device, which has been submitted for consideration, is the geni-
eral sales levy.'5 Since the sales tax is directly correlated to spending, civilian
consumption is discouraged by its imposition. At the same time the sales levy
produces considerable revenue and taxes income "currently as it is spent
[with] . . . no lag between the imposition and payment of the tax." "0 Yet
the basic objection to the sales tax appears to outweigh these factors. The
sales tax is notoriously regressive, imposing. as it does, a greater burden on
those in the lower income brackets than upon those more fortunately en-
dowed.' 7 The existence of an irreducible standard of living, a subsistence
income level which cannot be lowered without grave results, is extremely im-
portant in this connection.
In order to minimize the regressive effects of the sales tax, Senator Dana-
her proposed that a post-war refund be combined with a 10 per cent general
sales levy. Stamps, redeemable after the war, were to be issued in return for
the tax collected on each dollar's purchase.' Inasmuch as there is in the low
income brackets an immediate need for utilization of all income, the Danaher
plan, as originally proposed, would offer little relief to those most in need
of assistance. If, as seems likely, a large number of such stamps were sold
at a discount by those under economic duress, the regressive character of the
15. See note 7 supra. The claim of administrative simplicity, as an additional reason
for adoption of the sales tax, by the proponents of the general sales levy, has been vigor-
ously contested by Treasury officials. See House Hearings at 352-54 (problems arise
in definition-particularly when items are excluded from the tax; in arriving at a uni-
form tax base where installation and transportation changes are included in selling price;
where interest is incorporated in selling price as in an installment sale. Vast adminis-
trative problems are also involved in adequately policing the tax, probably entailing a
registration or licensing system).
One of the reasons assigned for the abandonment of the general sales tax, in nine of
the states which had adopted such a levy was the difficulty of administration. Blakey,
State Sales And Use Taxes (1942) 20 TAXES 227.
16. Address by Randolph E. Paul, Treas. Dep't Release No. 33-52, Oct. 8, 1942, at 6,
In these respects the sales tax is functionally similar to withholding at the source provi-
sions and the Treasury-recommended "spendings tax."
17. The actual effect of a flat 10% sales tax as expressed in income tax rates ig a
tax of 10% on a $500 income, 6% on a $2,500 income, 3% on a $10,000 income. Address
by Randolph E. Paul, Treas. Dep't Release No. 33-52, Oct. 8, 1942, at 7.
18. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1942, p. 26, col. 7.
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tax would, in effect, be heightened, by granting a bonus to those in better cir-
cumstances. Any attempt to enforce the non-negotiability of the stamps would
involve such administrative difficulties as to be infeasible. In recognition of
some of these problems, a supplement to the Danaher scheme was suggested.1 0
By its terms books of coupons would be issued to each individual, entitling
the recipient to $200 worth of tax-free purchases during the taxable year.
Admittedly, such an exemption would ease the over-all regressive impact of
a sales levy. Its disadvantages, however, are apparent in cases where incomes
are less than the exemption permitted and surplus certificates of exemption
exist. Since these certificates would probably find a ready market at a dis-
count, the plan would result in "a cash subsidy to some groups, and greatly
reduced tax payments by other members of the community." 2') Although a
subsidy to the lower income groups might be desirable in itself, it can be
achieved without concurrently granting tax privilege to the purchaser group.
No easy solution to the problem is presented by lowering the exemption per-
mitted, for by such action the whole purpose of the scheme would be vitiated.
Thus it would appear that the sales tax would remain an undesirable method
of war taxation despite any ameliorative effects of stamps bearing a post-war
refund or of presently effective certificates of exemption.
THE SPENDINGs TAx
The Treasury, in an attempt to avoid the regressive effects of a sales tax
and yet to retain its advantages as a curb on spending and its pay-as-you-go
effect, suggested a tax on spending 21 with a provision for withholding the
tax at the source. The spendings tax proposed, though rejected in com-
mittee, is to he differentiated from the sales tax in that it is calculated on the
basis of a return and hence allows for exemptions and deductions which can
only be taken by the individual filing the return.2 By the same token, a pro-
gressive tax base, a virtual impossibility in the sales tax, can be imposed when
the spendings tax is used.
Although the proposal for a spendings tax was unexpected, this kind of levy
has been the subject of violent discussion for many years. 3 In the middle of
the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill stated that ". . . the proper mode of
assessing an income tax would be to tax only the part of income devoted to
expenditure, exempting that which is saved." 2 4 In 1921, Ogden 'Mills, then
19. Ibid.
20. Address by Randolph E. Paul at Bronxville, New York, Treas. Dep't Release,
unlisted, Sept. 25, 1942, at 7.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. Services, rent and similar items can be included in the spendings tax base whereas
a sales tax cannot be imposed upon them without great difficulty.
23. See extensive bibliography collected in Fisuma AnD Fisn, Co;s=RucrIa In-
co.sn TAXATION (1942) 249-60
24. 2 MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL Economy (1564) 406.
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a member of Congress, submitted a bill 25 to tax spendings. That bill defined
spendings in the customary manner as "all personal and family payments,
disbursements and expenditures actually paid by or on account of the tax-
payer .... ,, 20 Since an individual's expenditures are widely disbursed with
almost infinite frequency, a tax based on this view of spendings would impose a
great burden on both the taxpayer and the Treasury in the calculation of the
sum to be taxed. A more adequate spendings base was indicated by Mills's
proposal that for purposes of auditing the return, the Treasury could elicit
the following information from the taxpayer: (1) the cash or equivalent
assets on hand at the beginning and close of the taxable year,27 (2) the total
receipts from all sources during the taxable year,28 (3) the "total payments
or disbursements including the amounts loaned," 29 and (4) certain items
such as investments and savings which were not taxable.30 Here can be dis-
cerned the germ of a new method of computing spendings, propounded by
Professor Irving Fisher 31 and adopted, in large measure, by the Treasury
in its spendings tax proposal. Under that proposal, annual spendings were
assumed to be the taxpayer's income and drawings on capital, less the amount
saved during the taxable year.3 2 Savings were defined as including the pur-
chase of capital assets, life insurance premium payments, annuity and pension
payments, debt repayments, amounts given away, and sums literally saved
as evidenced by bankbook entries 3a--in many cases funds which were exempt
from taxation under the Mills proposal.3 4 The relative administrative superior-
ity of the new manner of calculating spendings is apparent. For a tax on this
spendings base is in effect a tax on income with a credit for savings. And both
income and savings are more easily calculated than disbursements proper,
there being fewer transactions involved in each.
After spendings had been ascertained under the Treasury proposal, two dif-
ferent levies were to be imposed on the spendings base; a flat levy of 10 per
cent to be refunded without interest after cessation of hostilities ;3a and a non-
refundable surtax based upon a progressive rate scale.30
25. H. R. 7867, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921). See Mills, The Spendings Tax (1921)
BULL. NAT. TAX Ass'N 18; 61 CONG. REc. 5138-39 (1921).
26. H. R. 7867, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) § 342.
27. Id., § 348(b) (1).
28. Id., §348(b) (2).
29. Id., §348(b) (3).
30. Id., § 348(b) (4) by reference to §342(b). Similarly excluded from the tax
were reasonable business expenses, taxes pad-other than those levied on spendings,
contributions or gifts, medical expenses, funeral expenses, insurance premium payments.
31. See FISHER AND FISHER, op. cit. supra note 23, at x, 8.
32. See statement of Randolph E. Paul before the Senate Finance Committee in
Executive Sdssion, Treas. Dep't Release, unlisted, Sept. 3, 1942, at 2.
33. Id., exhibit 1. Cf. FISHER AND FISHER, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 8.
34. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
35. See Statement of Randolph E. Paul before the Senate Finance Committee in
Executive Session, Treas. Dep't Release, unlisted, Sept. 3, 1942, at 1-3,
36. Id, at 4-6,
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In calculating the tax liability under the refundable levy, personal exemp-
tions were to be used to determine whether an individual was to be taxed at
all.3 7 But once the individual liability to tax had been established, the per-
sonal exemption was to be subject to the tax. Thus an individual whose income
was not fully offset by savings credits and personal exemptions was to be taxed
10 per cent on personal exemptions as well as on the surplus income. Provision
was made to collect the 10 per cent levy at the source in order to facilitate
and make less onerous payment of the resulting tax liability.38 If the sum with-
held exceeded spendings tax liability because of savings deductions, the
amount collected would have been applied to the ordinary income tax liability;
and provision was made for a prompt refund if there was then an excess.
The spendings surtax was not to be collected at the source3 '? And the sur-
tax was further distinguished from the flat levy in that the surtax would have
been applied merely to the amount spent beyond personal exemptions.40 Al-
though the extent of an individual's spendings during a taxable year would
have been relevant in determining the taxability of personal exemption under
the refundable levy, the amount spent was to be of no consequence in calcu-
lating the effect of personal exemption under the surtax. Personal exemptions
were always to be taken from the base subject to the surtax.
Since an individual with a large family has more necessary expenditures
than an unmarried person with the same spendings base, an adjustment was
contemplated in the surtax rates applicable to family spendings.4U The spend-
ings tax base was to be divided by the number of people in the family, de-
pendent children counting as half a person, and the surtax rate applied to
the resulting figures individually, then added to determine the ultimate tax
liability. The relief granted by thus lowering the surtax rates was to have
been in addition to personal exemptions, which were themselves greater for
the individual with a family than for the one without. But this relief should
be carefully distinguished from personal exemptions, since personal exemp-
tions permit a complete escape from taxation while special provisions such
as the one proposed would only diminish the tax burden.
The spendings tax scheme advocated by the Treasury is to be sharply dis-
tinguished from a plan promulgated by Professor Fisher, one of the most vigor-
ous recent proponents of this form of taxation 42 Professor Fisher would com-
37. Id. at 3. Nevertheless, "to provide for a gradual transition between non-taxable
and taxable individuals, it is proposed that the tax on persons just above the exclusion
limits shall not exceed the excess of their spendings over the exclusion limits:' Ibid.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 4. It was, however, proposed that the spendings surtax be submitted with
a quarterly return, "with a final adjustment after the close of the year." Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 4-5.
42. See such writings as: THE N.rTuan oF CAPITAL ANDINCOMIE (1906); Tur Tuorn
OF INTEREST (1930) ; CoNSTRUCcvE IXCOME TAXATiON (1942); 4 Practical Schedule for
An Income Tax (1937) 15 TAxEs 379; Income in Theory and Inconie Taxation it Prac-
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pletely supplant the present system of income taxation '13 with a scheme predi-
cated on his hypothesis that unexpended income is, fundamentally, not in-
come.44 As a logical consequence of this view, the various provisions taxing
capital gains would be abolished,4 5 and the ultimate result of the scheme would
be to abolish the taxation of corporate profits, particularly profits not distribut-
ed as dividends. 46 The Treasury sought to have the spendings tax adopted
mertly to supplement ordinary income taxation, and, as evidenced by its
activities in connection with the Revenue Revision of 1942, does not presently
advocate the abolition of the capital gains tax or the various levies on cor-
porate profits. Furthermore, the Treasury emphasized that their spendings
tax plan would be in use "for the duration of the war-and for this period
,, 47
only....
tice (1937) 5 EcoNoxzracA 1; A Fundamental Reason for Not Taxing Savings (1941)
19 TAXES 3. Professor Fisher's views have been widely criticized. See SitoNs, Pun-
SONAL INcOmE TAXATION (1938) 89-100, 225-31; Hewett, Double Taxation of Savings
as Income (1941) 19 TAXES 270; Benjamin, The Rea.sons for Taxi.ng Savings (1941)
19 TAXES 271. Then see Fisher, Rebuttal In Reply to the Articles by Professor Hewett
and Mr. Benjamin (1941) 19 TAXES 276 and A Second Reason for Not Taxing Savngs
(1941) 19 TAXES 459. See also Senate Hearings at 2163-72.
43. See Senate Hearings at 2165. The Spendings Tax submitted by Mr. Ogden Mills
would be in lieu of the surtax; the normal tax would, however, be retained on an income
base. H. R. 7867, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) § 341.
44. See FISHER AND FISHER, CONsTRuCTivE INcoME TAXATION (1942) ; FiS:um, T'i
NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906). The conclusion rests on his contention
that the income consists of services actually rendered to an individual and not the mere
right to future consumption. Fisher, supra note 42, 5 EcONomETuICA at 1-15. Also pro-
pounded is the view that the taxation of unexpended income is detrimental to the economy
in that it prevents the accumulation of capital during the lifetime of an individual for pri-
vate investment. Professor Fisher cites the case of Mr. Ford as demonstrating the eco-
nomic value to the nation of accumulation of capital. Fisher, supra note 42, 19 TAxs at
460. The reallocation of economic power might be achieved, within the Fisher system, by
inheritance and death taxation, since individual initiative is the desideratum. Fisher, supra
note 42, 19 TAXES at 279. Nevertheless, under the Fisher plan there would still be an un-
diminished multiplication of capital during life which, though unspent, may be used anti-
socially. The process of economic coercion is not unfamiliar.
45. See Senate Hearings at 2168; Fisher, supra note 42, 15 TAXES at 387. Such a tax,
Professor Fisher claims, results in a form of double taxation since the market value of
stocks, bonds, and other capital is "dependent upon the expected future yield of the asset,
and not upon the enrichment or earnings which the owner of the asset expects to derive
from it." Benjamin, supra note 42, 19 TAXES at 272. "Any tax on savings is merely a
pretax on their yield. If we are to tax the yield after it comes we should not also tax
it before it comes. . . ." Senate Hearings at 2166 (testimony of Professor Fisher).
46. See Senate Hearings at 2172.
47. Address by Randolph E. Paul, Treas. Dep't Release No. 33-52, Oct. 8, 1942, at
13. But cf. statement of Professor Fisher: "The ultimate objective of this proposal for
income-tax reform is to substitute the net cash yield tax (or luxury-spendings tax) for
all existing income taxes, but this substitution could, if desired, be approached by suc-
cessive stages especially if the start were made." "If this recommendation were adopted,
it would be easy after the war to continue the new tax while repealing the pre-existing
[ Vol. 52 : 355
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Because of the limited operation and duration of the spendings tax sub-
mitted by the Treasury, most of the criticisms directed at the Fisher plan are
inapplicable. Thus under the Treasury proposal there would be no danger
of spendings being curtailed in a period demanding expansion of the market.
And reallocation of economic power, one of the ordinary functions of the tax
mechanism, would still be possible by virtue of the continued operation of the
basic tax system 45
When, on the other hand, the spendings tax is compared with the sales
levy, 49 the very fact that this tax would be imposed only during a limited
period is one of the elements which militates against it; for an entirely new
tax base is contemplated in a spendings tax, and considerable instruction would
therefore be required before its operation could be comprehended by those
affected. Although a general sales tax is also new to the federal system and
has its own administrative complexities,o the introduction of such a levy
would involve a less abrupt departure from common tax experience, and its
administrative burdens would affect fewer 51 people 2
Despite these considerations, the spendings tax would appear to he mure
desirable than the sales levy, for with a spendings tax it is possible to retain the
progressive character of the federal tax system. It is true that the spendings
tax, in its proposed form, was regressive to the extent that the levy imposed
under the refundable section was set at a flat rate of 10 per cent.," But such
income taxes or gradually reducing them until only the new spendings tax remained:'
Senatc Hcarhs at 2171.
48. In addition, Professor Simon's criticism of the Fisher conception sif income to the
effect that "acquisition of property rights may mean an increase of pqwver, greater free-
dom, security, prestige, and respectability" and is not just a mere right to future consump-
tion, is not as valid as it ordinarily would be, since there is only partial and temptrary
adherence to the spendings principle. SImoN. op. cit. supra note 42, at 97.
49. It should be noted that since both levies are placed upon disbursements of in-
come irrespective of source, it is possible to tax, in this way, exempt income such a- that
derived from government securities.
50. See note 15 mipra.
51. Nevertheless, though fewer individuals would be involved, the process of federal
auditing of returns submitted by the various retail outlets would be more complex, re-
quiring, perhaps, the submission of books for the inspection of travelling federal auditing
agents.
52. It is also possible to reach a greater amount of spending power through the sale;
tax. But the form of the sales levy most favored, exempting food, will reach only $32 bil-
lion out of the total consumer spendings while the spending tax will, it is estimated,
tax $50 billion. Supplement to the statement of Randolph E. Paul before the Senate
Finance Committee in Executive Session, Treas. Dep't Release, unlisted, Sept. 3, 1943,
at 2.
53. It is presumed that the flat levy was employed because of the difficulties involved
in withholding when a progressive rate scale is employed. Nevertheless although the
amount that was to be withheld by the withholding agent is more easily calculated f m a flat
basis without any reference to any other sources of income which might place the indi-
vidual in a higher rate bracket, a progressive rate structure cuuld be super-impused on
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a rate scheme is subject to alteration whereas a sales levy cannot be placed
on a progressive rate base, even though its regressive effect can be somewhat
ameliorated by tax-exempt coupons or rebates. Moreover, a spendings tax,
because it is a personal levy, does not require the elaborate precaution needed
in a sales tax system to prevent conflict with the price-fixing mechanism, in
obvious advantage in a war economy.
THE VIcToRY TAX
After hasty consideration, the Treasury's spending tax proposal was re-
jected 5 together with the general sales levy,r5 and as an alternative Senator
George's proposal for a temporary tax on the "victory tax net income" of indi-
viduals 50 was adopted. 7 The income base subject to the 5 per cent flat levy 68
is "gross" income, excluding income derived from the sale or exchange of cap-
ital assets,50 and interest on the obligations of the United States and its instru-
mentalities.60 Also excluded from this income base are amounts received
top of that. Thus the withholding rate might be set at 10%. Then, according to the
amount spent, the tax would progress from 10% to any figure desired. Tile instant ar-
rangement might be viewed as an application of such a structure since the 10% levy was
supplemented by the surtax range. Yet the flat levy was the only one refundable and was
calculated upon a different base insofar as the effect of the personal exemptions was
considered.
54. Senator Byrd, e.g., characterized the plan as "the most complicated and unwork-
able that has been submitted by tax experts to the Senate Finance Committee in the nine
years of my membership." "It has all the evils and none of the virtues of a sales tax.
The logic of the present situation points inevitably to a graduated sales tax with a
smaller tax on food and clothing." N. Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1942, p. 16, col. 4.
55. The Danaher modification of the sales tax was accorded similar treatment. See
N. Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1942, p. 1, col. 4.
56. Senator George has suggested the possibility of a 5% levy oil corporation gross
income-on a compulsory loan basis. N. Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1943, p. 1, col. 4.
57. Pub. L. No. 753, § 172 (to be Chapter 1, sub-chapter D of the INT. REv. Coon)
(hereafter referred to as Victory Tax).
58. Victory Tax, § 450. The suggestion has been made by Senator George to increase
the flat levy from 5% to 10%-the additional 5% being subject to post-war refund, N. Y,
Times, Jan. 10, 1943, p. 1, col. 4.
59. Victory Tax, § 451(a), as defined in § 117 (unless otherwise indicated, sections
hereafter cited will be the latest applicable section of the basic tax system in either the
Internal Revenue Code or subsequent amendments).
60. Victory Tax, § 451(a) excludes from gross income subject to the Victory Tax,
"interest allowed as a credit against net income under section 25(a) (1) and (2). . .
Section 25(a) (1) and (2) permit the interest on the obligations of the United States or
its instrumentalities which is included in gross income to be credited against net income
in calculating the normal tax but not the surtax. Since the statement in the Victory
Tax provision excludes interest allowed as a credit under § 25(a) (1) and (2), it might be
interpreted as excluding from the Victory Tax base only that income ordinarily granted
as a credit against net income, the amount credited for the purposes of the normal tax.
Nevertheless since interest allowed as a credit against net income under § 25(a) (1) and
(2) is included in gross income for normal tax purposes and since § 451 provides that such
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as compensation for injury or sickness.01 Deductions are granted only insofar
as they relate to trade operations, such as expenses 02 and losses c3 incurred
in operating a business, interest,0 4 bad debts,05 taxes ordinarily deductible,"
depreciation, 67 depletion, 8 and deductions allowable under the amortization
provisions. 9 For those engaged in business, the professions, or fanning, the
tax basis is, therefore, net income as normally defined.70 On the other hand,
for those who derive their income from wages, salaries, interest, and dividends,
the tax is imposed on gross income. However, deductions are permitted in a
few instances for alimony payments 71 and, in rare instances, for gifts to char-
ity.72 Once the "victory tax net income" is found, each individual filing a re-
turn is granted a specific statutory personal exemption of $624 against the
tax base 73 before the levy is imposed.
interest is not includible in gross income for the purposes of computing "victory tax net
income," the interest is withdrawn in Polo from the Victory Tax base.
61. Victory Tax, § 451 (a), thereby excluding such income ordinarily "included in
gross income by reason of the exception contained in section 22(b) (5) ..
62. Victory Tax, §451(a) (1), under §23(a) (1) and (2).
63. Victory Tax, § 451 (a) (4), under §23 (e) (1) which has particular reference to
losses by individuals "if incurred in trade or business. . . ." § 23(e) (1). Net oper-
ating losses are also deductible. Victory Tax, § 451(a) (9), under § 23(s).
Section 451 (a) (4) is subject to the limitation in § 23(h) which permits wagering
losses to be taken "only to the e-tent of the gains from such transactions?' It would
therefore seem that only those wagering losses involved in a "trade or business" will be
permitted under the Victory Tax.
It is also provided that capital losses are not to be deducted. Victory Tax,
§ 451 (a) (4). This provision appears to be in consonance with the provision excluding
capital gains from the Victory Tax base. Victory Tax, § 451 (a).
64. Victory Tax, § 451 (a) (2): "Interest allowable as a deduction by section 23(b),
if the indebtedness in respect of which such interest is allowed was incurred in carrying
on any trade or business ... "
65. Victory Tax, § 451 (a) (5), under § 23(k) (1) which specifically excludes deduc-
tion in the case of a non-business debt.
66. Victory Tax, § 451(a) (3), under § 23(c) "to the extent such amounts are paid
or incurred in connection with the carrying on of a trade or business ... "
67. Victory Tax, § 451 (a) (6), under § 23(1) which is limited to property used in
trade or business or in the production of income.
68. Victory Tax, § 451(a) (7), under §§ 23(m) and (n) which are only applicable to
certain industry groups such as mines, oil, and gas wells.
69. Victory Tax, § 451 (a) (10), under § 23(t.
70. See § 23.
71. Victory Tax, § 451(a) (11), under § 23(u).
72. Victory Tax, § 451 (a) (12), under § 120 which grants an unlimited deduction for
charitable and other contributions delineated in § 23(o) where an individual's contribu-
tions in gifts "in each of the 10 preceding taxable years" "plus the amount of income,
war-profits, or excess-profits taxes paid during such year in respect of tli preceding
taxable years, exceeds 90 per centum of the tax-payer's net income for each such
year. . . ." § 120.
73. Victory Tax, § 452.
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A post-war rebate of part of the funds collected is contemplated under the
Victory Tax.74 Forty per cent, limited to $1,000,15 will be refunded to a fam-
ily head "as soon as practicable after date of cessation of hostilities." 10 An
additional rebate of 2 per cent, limited to $100, will be given for each de-
pendent child.77 The refund to "a single person or a married person not living
with husband or wife" is 25 per cent, limited to $500.78 Amounts subject to
the post-war refund are to be diminished, however, by credits which the indi-
vidual can immediately take against the victory tax liablity under a special
relief section.7 9 Section 453 permits a diminution of present tax payments
by the sums expended on insurance premiums in force on September 1,
1942,30 the net repayment of debts beyond the smallest amount of indebtedness
in the period from September 1, 1942, to the close of the year preceding the
one in which the tax is levied, 81 and the amounts expended on United States
Government bonds subsequent to December 31, 1942.82 These immediate
credits may not, however, exceed the extent of the post-war rebates.8 3
Since the credits under Section 453 are permitted against the net tax liabil-
ity itself rather than deducted from the income to be taxed, expenditures com-
ing within the special relief section may serve to eradicate all of the present
tax liability subject to a post-war rebate.8 4 If the post-war refund can be an-
ticipated in this manner, the presently effective rate of the tax will in most
cases be substantially reduced. 85 The most obvious reason for levying a 5 per
74. Victory Tax, § 454.
75. Victory Tax, § 454(a) (2).
76. Defined in Victory Tax, § 475 (b) as the date fixed by proclamation by the Presi-
dent or by concurrent resolution of the House and Senate as ending the hostilities,
with Germany, Italy, or Japan. If such conclusion of hostilities, however, occurs at dif-
ferent times with different countries the date chosen may be "an appropriate date for the
purposes of this subchapter." It is therefore apparent that a good deal of discretion might
be used in determining the ultimate date for repayment-and the inflationary effects of a
release of capital can be carefully considered before such refund.
77. Victory Tax, § 454(a) (3).
78. Victory Tax, §454(a) (1).
79. Victory Tax, § 453.
80. Victory Tax, § 453(a) (1). Such a credit is available for the premiums paid for
insurance upon the life of the taxpayer's spouse or dependents as well as his own, The
credit similarly applies to premiums paid upon renewal or conversion of such insurance-
to the extent of the payments as of September 1, 1942.
81. Victory Tax, § 453 (a) (2).
82. Victory Tax, § 453(a) (3). The amount that may be credited in this manner i.
limited to the net purchases of government bonds. Therefore, an individual may not
purchase and sell quantities of bonds and thus qualify for the credit. Further limitations
may be imposed upon the amounts available under the bond purchase credit since the
Secretary "may by regulations prescribe" the type of the qualifying obligations and the
conditions of purchase thereof.
83. Victory Tax. § 453(b).
84. This is particularly true when the tax liability, under a 5% levy, is relatively
small.
85. See note 92 infra.
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cent tax, with provision for refund after cessation of hostilities, is to withdraw
consumer purchasing power now and release it at a time when consumer de-
mand will need augmentation. Yet this cannot be done if post-war refunds
are anticipated. It would appear, therefore, advisable to alter the provision
for such relief in some way more consistent with the purposes of the Act.
One possible solution would be to permit the sums now credited against the
tax itself to be deducted from the income subject to the tax.8
Other provisions in the Victory Tax may be criticized as being intensifica-
tions of the inequities in the regular income tax system. Additional benefit
is given to holders of federal obligations on which interest is ordinarily exempt
only as to the normal tax.8 7 Under the Victory Tax provisions such interest
is completely exempt.88 Furthermore, added advantage is given to those who
split family income to avail themselves of lower surtax rates under the ordinary
tax law, since Section 452 of the Victory Tax grants a specific exemption of
$624 to every individual, married or not, filing a separate return.89 And Sec-
tion 25(b) (1) of the basic tax system specifically provides that if "husband
and wife [living together] make separate returns, the personal exemption
must be taken by either or divided between them." 01
The provision for personal exemption in the Victory Tax may also be criti-
cized for its inadequacy in relation to family need. No differentiation is made
in Section 452 between the unmarried individual and the family unit.01 Some
concession is made, however, to varying needs in the provisions for post-war
rebates in which 40 per cent is granted to the married person with 2 per cent
for each dependent, as opposed to 25 per cent for the individual. Because of the
high possibility for anticipation of post-war refunds, the effective rate of the
tax may be expressed as 3Y4% for the single individual and 3 per cent, or
lower, depending on the number of dependents, for the married one.02 Thus
some tax liability is imposed on every married individual with a victory tax
net income of more than $624. If, however, there were an exemption provi-
sion specifically differentiating between individual and married status, no lia-
bility could accrue on the amount excluded, and a minimal subsistence income
range would be protected.
86. Still another measure that might be adopted to mitigate the difficulty would
diminish by a fixed amount the amounts credited. If a 50 per cent limitation is adopted,
a married person who has made himself eligible to a $100 credit under the present Vic-
tory Tax provisions, would be eligible to a $50 credit under the proposed limitation-
thus limiting the possibilities of the refund.
87. Victory Tax, § 451(a). See note 60 supra.
88. Ibid.
89. Victory Tax, § 452.
90. Section 25(b) (1).
91. Victory Tax, § 452.
92. Assuming complete anticipation, 40% of the 5c levy gives the above indicated
rate of 3% while 25% of the 5% levy results in a 34% effective rate.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Still another technical defect of serious proportions may be discerned in
the Victory Tax when the provisions for credit against the post-war rebate
are coordinated with the withholding at the source sections. Section 466 re-
quires that 5 per cent be withheld on all wages "to the extent that such wages
are includible in gross income" over the $624. 93 This measure assumes that
the tax will be paid in all circumstances where gross income exceeds $624,
an assumption which would be quite correct if the theory of the measure were
actually embodied in its provisions. As we have seen, with regard to wage
income there are few occasions when the personal exemption can be aug-
mented by deductions. Therefore a tax can be imposed at the source on all
wages grossing more than $624 without fear of extensive refunds at the end
of the year for overcollection. But where the anticipation provisions are used,
millions of refunds are made possible. The tax has been withheld at the rate
of 5 per cent, yet the actual tax liability is substantially lower, In many of
these instances the taxpayer will still have no right to an actual refund since
any excess in the amount withheld will be credited against his normal tax
obligation. 4 But consider the not uncommon situation of a married individual
with an income of $1,200. Against this income a $624 personal exemption is
taken, and a tax levy of 5 per cent is collected during the course of the year
on the remainder, the amount thus collected being $28.80. Assume an ability
to credit bond purchases or debt repayments to the permitted 40 per cent
against the $28.80 collected, and there will be a refund claim of $11.52 which
cannot be offset by other tax claims since the individual has an ordinary tax
exemption of $1,200. To say that not many people will take advantage of these
just claims does not cure the defect. But even so, it may be anticipated that a
substantial number will seek a refund. Adequate expediting machinery will,
therefore, have to be set up,05 and this will involve a great administrative bur-
den achieving inconsequential results.90
Even though the Victory Tax were revised to meet these objections, there
would be some question as to whether it would provide a satisfactory solution
to the war-time tax problem. If adequate provision were made for family
need,"' if the credit against tax provisions were altered so that the post-war
93. Victory Tax, § 466(a).
94. Victory Tax, § 466(e).
95. Provision for refunds is made in the basic tax system under § 322. This has been
designed, however, for a relatively limited number of claims. The present organization,
it seems, would have to be expanded, and the provision for refund simplified in view of
the small amounts involved and the fact that those most likely to assert successful claims
will be in the lower income brackets.
96. Recognition of these problems has been indicated by the tentative adoption, by
the House Ways and Means subcommittee to study pay-as-you-go methodology, of a 3%
withholding rate for the Victory Tax to correspond with its effective tax rate. N. Y.
Times, March 2, 1943, p. 11, col. 4.
97. See discussion supra at 367.
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refund principle was retained and administrative problems were obviated,"
and if a progressive rate schedule were substituted for the inequitable flat levy
now imposed,09 a tax system not unlike that hitherto exclusively used would
result. The Victory Tax in that case would act, roughly, as a super surtax.
Although greater revenue would be collected as a result of the imposition of the
additional levy, the effect upon consumer expenditures would by no means
be as direct and effective as under the spendings or sales tax. The Victory
Tax, as now constituted, does not conform to the wartime tax objective of
reducing consumer expenditures any better than the revised, more equitable
system indicated above. The only intrinsic merit of the Victory Tax, as now
constituted, would seem to be its modification of the regressive character of
the sales tax to obviate the complications of the coupon system. But the tax
is nevertheless regressive and even lacks one of the major redeeming features
of the sales tax, its direct impact on spending.
THE WITHHOLDING PRINCIPLE
Despite the administrative complexities involved in its operation, there is
in the tax measures heretofore discussed a persistent recognition of the with-
holding at the source concept. When approximately 35,000,000 taxpayers
file returns, many of whom do so for the first time,10 the possibilities of eva-
sion are manifest.10 ' Yet the need for the withholding technique of revenue
collection goes beyond the desire to curtail dependence on individual initiative
in filing a return.'0 2 When taxation reaches such a large proportion of an
individual's income, as under the new rate schedules, some assistance should
be given him in the manner of payment on an enforced budgetory basis. In
98. See discussion supra at 368.
99. In this respect, the Victory Tax invites criticism similar to that made of the
sales tax. See note 17 supra.
100. "As you know up until 1941 we have never received as many as 3,000,00D income-
tax returns in a year. In 1941 that number increased to 16,000,000; in 1942 it increased
to 27,000,000. This year we expect 35,000,000 individual income-tax returns." Hearings
before Committee on Ways and Means on a Proposal to Place Income Tax of 11di-
viduals on a Pay-As-You-Go Basis, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 2. (Statement of J. L.
Sullivan, Ass't See'y of the Treasury).
101. This is a problem apart from that arising when taxes are uncollectible once the
returns have been submitted. The amounts uncollectible are quite low: .5% of total col-
lections in 1941, and .3% in 1942, and averaging 1.3% for the past 22 years. Hearings
before Committee on Ways and Means on a Proposal to Place Income Tax of Il:dkqd-
uals on a Pay-As-You-Go Basis, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 25, 26. Undoubtedly even
these small figures could be somewhat abated by collection at the source.
102. The desire to forestall evasion was not in itself sufficient to prevent abandon-
ment, in 1917, of the substantial utilization of withholding at the source in the Revenue
Act of 1913. 40 STAT. 300, 301 (1917); Revenue Act of 1917, § 3. In its stead an in-
formation at the source technique was employed. See Lent, Collection of the Personal
income Tax at the Source (1942) 50 J. Poi- EcoN. 719, 723-24.
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addition, this method of tax payment assists in the withdrawal of consumer
purchasing power by acting upon income before it can possibly be spent.
The withholding principle was first substantially employed in the Revenue
Act of 1913.103 There it was provided that all persons or firms in whatever
capacity having control, receipt, disposal, or payment of the fixed or deter-
minable annual or periodical gains of another person subject to taxation, 10 4
were obligated to withhold 1 per cent, the normal tax, 05 on all rent and wage
disbursements made to the individual beyond $3,000, the personal exemption
for an unmarried individual at that time.100 By written application to the
withholding agent, 10 7 the increased personal exemptions due to marriage 105
and any normal deduction such as business expense, interest on indebtedness,
and net loss 109 could be taken in addition to the $3,000 minimum before any
tax was imposed at the source. A similar right to deduction and exemption
credit was provided for interest and income from "bonds and mortgages, or
deeds of trust, or . . .similar obligations of corporations," 1Fo even though the
sum disbursed through interest and dividends was not subjected by the terms
of the Act to the requirement that it exceed $3,000 before withholding could be
applied. This conscious effort to reduce the possibility of refunds to a minimum,
though by a crude process, is better than the withholding provision of the Vic-
tory Tax in which no effort whatever is made to prepare for that contingency.
Considerable difficulty was involved, of course, in submitting a statement of ex-
pense to the withholding agent,"1 though the prognostication was reduced
when withholding was not to occur until at least $3,000 had been disbursed.
Six months or more would usually elapse before withholding began,112 by
103. 38 STAT. 166, 170, Revenue Act. of 1913, f1 E, declared constitutional in Brush-
aber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1 (1916).
104. 38 STAT. 166, 170, Revenue Act of 1913, ff E.
105. Ibid.
106. 38 STAT. 166, 168, Revenue Act of 1913, ff C.
107. If made "not less than thirty days prior to the day on which the return of his
income is due. . . ." 38 STAT. 166, 170, Revenue Act of 1913, E.
10& Ibid, under 38 STAT. 166, 168, Revenue Act of 1913, U C.
109. Ibid, under 38 STAT. 166, 167, Revenue Act of 1913, 1 B.
110. 38 STAT. 166, 170-71, Revenue Act of 1913, lIE.
111. ". . . Nor shall any person . . .be allowed the benefit of any deduction
unless he shall . . . either file with the person who is required to withhold and pay
tax for him a true and correct return of his annual gains, profits, and income from all
other sources, and also the deductions asked for, and the showing thus made shall then
become a part of the return to be made in his behalf by the person required to withhold
and pay the tax, or likewise make application for deductions to the collector of the
district in which return is made or to be made for him ... " 38 STAT. 166, 170, Rev-
enue Act of 1913, 1 E.
112. The exemption credit for family status could be taken prior to the filing of a
claim for deduction credit on all types of income subject to withholding under the 1913
Act. At that point there is no need for a declaration of income and expense. 38 STAT.
166, 170-71, Revenue Act of 1913, E.
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which time certain deductions for expenses or interest payments might have
been an accomplished fact, or well indicated. But by reason of just this lapse
of time, the present objectives of spreading the tax burden over the year, and
of withdrawing purchasing power by anticipation could not be attained under
the 1913 provision.
Although the Victory Tax makes no attempt to minimize the possibility of
refunds, it does succeed in spreading withholding throughout the year by
means of a withholding deduction."13 This deduction is taken against the
wage in each pay period before the tax is imposed. It consists simply of the
personal exemption, $624, which when taken against a weekly pay period,
results in a deduction of $12 from each wage payment.
Supplement "U," which was included in the 1942 Revenue Bill 114 when it
was passed by the House but deleted on subsequent adoption of the Victory
Tax, incorporated into one system both the advantage of periodic withholding
contained in the Victory Tax and that of diminution of refunds provided for
in the 1913 measure. In Supplement "U" the withholding deduction was com-
puted by adding to personal exemptions and credit for dependents 10 per cent
of the sum of these figures." 0r This additional deduction was based on the
assumption presumably justified by experience,"" that normal deductions
taken by the lower income groups would not exceed the amount thus de-
rived.117 Because of it, the prognostication inherent in the 1913 provision
would have been unnecessary under Supplement "U", and a reserve not found
in the Victory Tax would have been created against the possibility of refunds.
With a similar deduction added to meet the problems created by anticipa-
tion of post-war refunds," 8 the Victory Tax provision for withholding would
113. Victory Tax, § 466(b). When the payroll period is bi-weekly the withholding de-
duction is $24; $26 when semi-monthly; $52 when monthly; $156 when quarterly; and
$312 when semi-annually. Provision is also made for withholding on a proportionate basis
when aberrational payroll periods are involved, Victory Tax, § 466(a) (2) to § 46(a) (5).
114. . R. 7378, § 153, as passed by the House of Representatives, S3 Co:-. Rmc.,
July 20, 1942, at 6592 (hereafter cited as Supplement "U") wvas replaced in Pub. L. No,.
753, § 172, pt. II by the Victory Tax withholding provision.
115. Supplement "U," § 426(b).
116. The principle involved is similar to that emplVyed in calculating the tax liability
for the Supplement "T" taxpayer (on a simplified form where gr, income is 1$3,000 or
less). See §400.
117. Concern was limited to meeting the possibility of deductions in the lower income
brackets since it is in that group that there is the greatest likelihtofd of overwithholding
and thus refund.
Supplement 1U," § 191(h) (1) (a) (1) and § 191(h) (a) (2) provided for crediting
overpayments and excess withholdings against other tax liability in a fashion similar to
that provided in the Victory Tax, § 466(e).
118. Since, under the Victory Tax, the credits for the retirement of outstanding
debts, insurance premium payments, and bond purchases are taken against the tax liabil-
ity itself, it seems that a rather large additional withholding deduction would be required
for a satisfactory result.
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be easier to administer than Supplement "U." Supplement "U" was designed
for use in the basic tax system, and so differentiating measures had to be
included to cope with the various stages of family status and the consequent
differences in tax exemption granted in the basic system. The Victory Tax,
on the other hand, grants a flat $624 exemption with no direct variations for
family status. Under it, therefore, the employer need know only the wage
disbursed to calculate the amount to be withheld.1 0 Under the Supplement
"U" provision, however, he would have to know not only the wage but also
the marriage status and number of dependents of his employee. And if the
usual system of schedules were used to determine employee tax liability, a
considerable multiplicity of charts would result. Nevertheless the additional
burden which would be imposed by the several bookkeeping operations in-
volved, does not appear large enough to outweigh the need for a distinction
between individual and family status.
The administrative problem might possibly have been intensified, however,
under the provision in Supplement "U" for withholding on bond interest
and dividend disbursements,1 20 for a vast number of individual payments of
this character are made even by small corporations. 121 To mitigate this diffi-
culty, the withholding deduction was omitted under the normal operation of
Supplement "U" as to dividends and interest payments, and provision was
made for collection at the source, at the full rate, upon the total amount dis-
bursed in this manner.1 22 But no tax could be collected if an affidavit was
filed stating that the gross income of the recipient of dividends and interest pay-
ments would not exceed his permitted personal exemptions. Although this fea-
ture introduces an element of prognostication similar to that in the 1913 meas-
ure, the two provisions are very different. Deductible expenses as well as gross
receipts were to be foretold under the 1913 provision whereas only income
would be predicted under Supplement "U." Moreover, the number of individ-
119. Victory Tax, § 466(c) provides a simplified set of schedules to be used at the
election of the employer when the payroll period is either weekly, bi-weekly, semi-
monthly, or monthly. The amount to be withheld under these schedules is, for the weekly
payroll period, calculated on $5 wage bands until $40 weekly and $10 wage bands beyond
that. (Variations occur in the different payroll period schedules). This obviates separate
calculations for a wage of $12 or $12.50, or any other fraction of the wage band-
greatly simplifying the procedure to be followed. Supplement "U" contained no such
device although the wage band system as applied to Supplement "U" met with approval
in the Senate. See Seite Hearings at 1685-91. Although the wage band system un-
doubtedly results in a higher rate of withholding for those in the lower part of the par-
ticular band, and vice versa, the amounts involved are relatively insignificant. See Sen-
ate Hearings at 1687.
120. Supplement "U, § 426(a).
121. See Memorandum by C. H. Mylander, Chairman, Comm. on Taxation, American
Bankers Ass'n, Senate Hearings at 1997-2001.
122. Supplement "U," §426(b) provided a withholding deduction only in respect to
wage payments.
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uals eligible to apply for exemption was much greater in 1913 than it would
have been under Supplement "U." 123
The clerical burdens involved in preparing and issuing receipts for amounts
withheld constitute a more substantial administrative difficulty in applying
the withholding provisions to dividend and interest payments. One way of
meeting this difficulty would be to exempt certain categories of payment from
the withholding requirement. Supplement "U" provided that withholding be
applied specifically to bond interest.124 It would appear, therefore, that interest
payments made by banks and by individuals on ordinary debts were excluded
from the withholding requirement. Dividend payments were not, however,
excluded.'2 5 Yet Senate committee discussions '-'I before the adoption of the
Victory Tax indicate there was some support for the exclusion of certain
payments of a nominal character, and dividend payments made by preferred
groups such as building and loan associations, cooperative banks, cooperative
savings and loan associations, credit unions, and farm cooperatives.1' If such
exclusion had been granted, care would have been necessary at all times to
prevent interference with the proper functioning of the provision, for it may
be assumed that upon the grant of an exclusion to any one group, pressure
would have been exerted by many others for similar treatment.
In addition to the difficulties inherent in the withholding system itself, there
are problems arising from the effect of withholding on our regular revenue
collecting pattern. Tax obligations accruing in one year have usually been
satisfied in the next. Under the withholding system, however, payment is
made in the same year the obligation is incurred. Thus when withholding is
instituted, a double tax burden is imposed. In 1943, for example, the indi-
vidual must pay not only his 1942 tax obligation but also part of his 1943 debt.
The Treasury thought this double burden a sufficient hardship to warrant
modification of its original proposal for immediate adoption of 10 per cent with-
holding under Supplement "U." The withholding scheme was, therefore, to be
imposed in two steps. Five per cent was to be withheld during the first year
123. Those eligible to apply for exemption in 1913 included individuals having incomes
of 3,000 a year, if single, $4,000, if married, and an even greater number where deducti-
ble expenses were involved. Supplement 'U' considerably narrows the number eligible
for such exemption in that much lower income groups are involved: those making less
than $500, if single, $1,200, if married, plus $,350 for each dependent, the exemptions per-
mitted in the normal tax system.
124. Supplement "U," § 426(a). . . .We started out last year favoring collection
at the source on bonds, but we found that there are a great many administrative prob-
lems involved, and the amount of income involved in the item does not seem to us to
justify the difficulties we would encounter." Hearings before Committee on Ways ard
Means on a Proposal to Place Income Tax on Indh,'duals on a Pay-As-You-Go Basis,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 36 (statement of Randolph E. Paul).
125. Supplement "U," §426(a).
126. See Senate Hearings at 964-68 (in connection with the testimony of M. Bodfish,
F.ec. Vice-President, United States Savings and Loan League).
127. Ibid.
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and 10 per cent in the next.12 8 In this way the actual double burden would
have been 5 per cent each year, since the obligation paid in the second year
would have been diminished by the amount withheld in the first.
THE RUML PLAN
One important aspect of the Pay-As-You-Go Plan promulgated by Beards-
ley Ruml 12' is specifically designed to remove the difficulties involved in plac-
ing tax collection on a current basis. Under the plan the additional tax burden
during the transitional period is removed by the expedient of forgetting a
year's tax liability. Payments made by an individual 1-30 in 1943 are used under
the present system to satisfy his 1942 tax obligation. Under the Ruml plan,
however, they are used to satisfy his 1943 obligation.' 81 Once the current
basis is established, the amounts withheld in January and February of 1943
are credited in March against the first quarterly payment of the 1943 tax. The
same procedure is employed as to the remaining quarterly payments, and the
1943 tax obligation is almost completely satisfied.132 One of the basic objec-
128. Supplement "U," §426(a).
129. See RumL, THE PAY-As-You-Go INCOME TAX PLAN (revised, Nov. 16, 1942)
27; Senate Hearings at 186 (statement by B. Ruml on the Pay-As-You-Go Income Tax
Plan).
130. The Ruml plan, as originally proposed, was limited in its application to individual
and partnership income, and the income of trusts which are taxable to the grantor or to
the beneficiary-corporate income being excluded. See RUML, op. cit. supra note 129,
at 21-22; Senate Hearings at 183 (statement by B. Ruml on the Pay-As-You-Go Income
Tax Plan).
131. See RUML, op. cit. supra note 129, at 8. Mr. Ruml also has suggested that those in
the armed forces or federal civil service "be allowed to choose whether they prefer to
skip 1942 or 1941" so that the period most beneficial to those in the indicated groups can
be selected. Ibid.
132. There would be a slight duplication of tax burden during the transitional period.
This duplication is indicated by an illustration of the operation of withholding in the
Ruml system: "Suppose a taxpayer (married with no dependents) receives income from
wages or salary amounting to $3,000 in both 1942 and 1943. He would report in 1943 ten-
tative tax of $306, payable in four installments of $76.50. The amounts withheld during
1943 (at a rate of 18 per cent) would be $25.50 a month. Against the installment of ten-
tative tax due March 15, 1943, the taxpayer could credit the amount withheld during Jan-
uary and February 1943, equaling $51, and pay the balance of $25.50. Against the install-
ments due June 15 the taxpayer could credit the amounts withheld in March, April and
May, amounting to $76.50-and would therefore owe no balance. Against the installments
due September 15 and December 15 the taxpayer would likewise be able to credit the
amounts withheld during a three months' period and therefore owe no balance. The total
effect would be that his payments in 1943-the amounts actually paid plus the amounts
withheld-would be $331.15; during this transition period the only increase in tax caused
by the institution of a withholding system would be the amount of $25.50 withheld dur-
ing 1 month." Senate Hearings at 186-87 (statement by B. Ruml ol the Pay-As-You-
Go Income Tax Plan). For a possible alternative involving no duplication, see Senate
Hearings at 187, note 15.
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tions to the skip-a-year procedure is the loss of a tax asset occasioned by it.13:
Although this loss occurs only when the individual taxpayer's obligation ceases
and is thus spread over a period of years, it would seem undesirable in view
of rising public indebtedness. If the loss is met by an increase in the revenue
rates, a new taxpaying group, not benefiting under the skip-a-year provision,
will bear the increase in the tax burden without the compensating advantage
of the skipped year.1'3
The other, more enduring, phase of the Runl plan is the procedure whereby
tax payments are to be kept on a "current basis" and the tax obligation met in
the year in which it is incurred. 35 The mechanism is arranged so as to avoid
the difficulties involved, in most cases, in anticipating income for that part of
the year subsequent to the filing of a tax return. The return in any one year
under the Ruml plan is tentatively based upon the preceding year's income.
And in computing the succeeding year's return an adjustment is made to ac-
count for any variation between the income bases of the two years preceding it.
Thus in computing the 19-44 return an adjustment would be made for varia-
tions between the 1942 and 1943 income bases. At the same time a tentative
payment of the succeeding year's obligation is made by relation to the income
earned in the year preceding.'3 6 Thus payment in 1944 on the 1944 obliga-
tion would be tentatively based on the 1943 income.
In the attempt to obtain payment of the tax obligation in the year in which
it arises, difficulty is encountered in determining the tax rate to be employed.
Under the present system the tax rate invoked in any one year is not usually
deteymined until well along in that year. To obviate this difficulty, Ruml has
proposed that the tax rates enacted in one year be applied to the next year's
income.137 If this were done, the revenue loss resulting from the skip-a-year
provision of the Ruml plan would be augmented in a rising rate system by a
loss due to the lag in the application of tax rates.' 38
133. The Treasury has indicated a loss in tax assets of $10,00,000 upnn adoption of
the Ruml skip-a-year feature. N. Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1943, p. 1, cnl. 1. See Hcarigs
before Committee on Wqys and Means on a Proposal to Place hianic Tax of Idhidvals
on a Pay-As-You-Go Basis, 78th Cong., 1st Sss. (1943) 16-20.
134. See Hearings before Comnuittee on W'ays and Means on a Proposal to Place
Income Tax of Individuals on a Pay-As-Yon-Go Basis, 78th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1943) IS:
"Since the cash receipts of the Treasury could be maintained even though the tax liabil-
ity was forgiven, the effect of wiping out an income-tax asset through forgiveness can
be more readily visualized and measured in terms of its relative effect on the different
groups in the community who will be called upon to maintain the flow of revenue. The
fact that the Government may take in as much money in a fiscal year, despite the for-
giveness of a year's tax liabilities, reflects larger payments by some taxpayers, offsetting
smaller payments by others?'
135. See Ruinm, op. cit. supra note 129, at 9.
136. Ibid.
137. A change in exemption status would similarly not be applied until the subsequent
year. RumL, op. cit. supra note 129, at 22-23.
138. Mr. Ruml has impliedly conceded this in stating that the "decrease in income
tax is equivalent to the tax on 1 year's income at the eww rates; or, in other words, the
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These conclusions are concretely illustrated in the following tables 189 where,
for purposes of illustration, the changes involved are magnified as well as sim-
plified. In both illustrations the tax rate is assumed to be 5 per cent in 1942,
10 per cent in 1943, 20 per cent in 1944. In the first illustration these rates
are applied to a stable income; in the second, to a progressively higher income.
Cessation of income is assumed to be at the beginning of 1945, and the year
skipped on the introduction of the plan is taken as being 1942.
1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
A-Net income .................... $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 0
Tax liability, present system .... 50 100 200
Tax paid, present system ........ 50 100 200 350
Tax liability, Ruml plan ......... 50 100
Tentative tax, Ruml plan ........ 50 100
Deficit or refund, Ruml plan ........
Total actually paid, Ruml plan 50 100 ISO
1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
B-Net income ..................... $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 0
Tax liability, present system .... 50 200 600
Tax paid, present system ........ 50 200 600 850
Tax liability, Rum1 plan ......... 100 300
Tentative tax, Ruml plan ........ 50 200
Deficit or refund, Ruml plan -... . 50 -100
Total actually paid, Ruml plan .. 50 250 100 400
The revenue loss in illustration A is $200, of which only $50 represents the
sum due in the year skipped. The result is intensified in illustration B, where
the loss is $450 with only $50 involved in the year dropped.
Obviously the effect of the rate lag would be reversed in a period of declin-
ing rates. But when tax rates are lowered, the reasons for making the de-
crease immediately effective are perhaps more impelling than in the case of
an increase. It would seem as desirable in the one case as in the other to
have the changed rates take immediate effect.
If the Ruml plan were adopted, the possibility of revenue loss or loss to the
taxpayer by virtue of the postponed effect of a newly enacted tax levy could
be minimized by altering Congressional scheduling so that the tax rate applied
in any one year would be enacted prior to the time for filing the return in that
year. In this way the tax rate could be placed on a current basis, 1943 rates
applying to 1943 income. And the sum lost would be, at most, 140 the amount
tax on [net income] at 1941 Act rates, plus the difference between the tax on [net in-
come] at the new rates and at 1941 Act rates" (italics added). Senate Hearings at 194,
note 3 to table 6 (statement by B. Ruml on the Pay-As-You-Go Income Tax Plan).
139. The table form used here is adapted from that employed by Mr. Ruml. See
Senate Hearings at 190-93 (statement by B. Ruml on the Pay-As-You-Go Income Tax
Plan).
140. It is most likely, however, that a lesser sum would be lost. See discussion infra
at 377-7&
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due in the year skipped. On the basis of the assumptions made for illustra-
tions A and B, the result is indicated in the following:
1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
C-Net income ................. $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 0
Tax liability, present system ..... 50 100 200
Tax paid, present system ........ s0 100 200 350
Tax liability, Ruml plan ......... 100 200
Tentative tax, Ruml plan ....... s0 100
Deficit or refund, Ruml plan .... -50 -100
Total actually paid, Rural plan .. 50 150 100 .300
Adjustments in the skip-a-year provision of the Ruml plan are needed to
minimize the revenue loss occasioned by that provision and to do away with
special privileges granted to certain taxpayers when the tax obligation for
any one year is dropped. The individual with what is for him an unusually
high income in the year skipped escapes tax obligation on the extraordinary
gain as well as on his normal income.14 1 In order to forestall the possibility
of this privilege, Ruml has suggested that the tax on capital gains he retained
during the transitional year, assuming, to a large extent justifiably, that most
income within the category described results from an aberrational capital
gains transaction 42 In the revised statement of his plan Ruml has further
suggested that any claim of credit above $10,000 arising out of an extreme
variation in income be reduced by substituting for the individual's actual
income in the skipped year a "fair normal income" consisting of an average
of his income in some such period as 1941-1943.143 A special death tax to
minimize income tax privilege resulting from death during the skipped year
is also proposed in this statement.14 4 Certainly the incorporation of these pro-
141. See address by Randolph E. Paul, Treas. Dep't Release No. 33-52, Oct. 8, 1942,
at 11. The individual with a consistently high income would also be the recipient of
special privilege. "The increase in income taxes for the 3 year period 194042 amounts
to $182 for a married person with no dependents and a net income of $2,000. The amount
that would be forgiven this individual is $140, or 77 per cent of the increase for the 3
years. At the $100,000 level, the amount forgiven equals 102 per cent of the increase in
taxes and at the $1,000,000 level, 320 per cent. For an individual with a $1,000,000 in-
come in each of the 5 years 1938-42 the reduction in tax liabilities resulting from com-
plete forgiveness would more than offset all tax increases enacted since 1935:' Hearngs
before Committee on Ways and Means on a Proposal to Place Income 'ax of ndhidutals
on a Pay-As-You-Go Basis, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 19.
142. See RumL, op. cit. supra note 129, at 10.
143. A claim for credit would arise when the tentative tax based on the preceding
year's income had proven too large when synchronized to the current income. An aver-
age might be taken of 1941, 1942, and 1943 income when the claim of credit e.ceeds
$10,000 "or some other suitable amount. . . " "The cancellation of tax would apply to
this average income only, and the balance of tax on actual 1942 income to the extent that
it exceeded $10,000 would not be credited or refunded." Ibid.
144. "This tax should be steeply graduated and should take most of the higher bracket
income tax that would otherwise be cancelled, but it should leave some balance of the
cancelled tax in the estate subject to ordinary estate taxes only." Ibid. The provision
for a special death tax apart, the loss of revenue would be somewhat diminished by the
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visions in the Ruml plan would minimize the possibilities of privilege and at
the same time decrease revenue loss.
Rum1 correctly maintains that the income tax loss resulting from death dur-
ing the transitional period would be minimized not only by the special death tax
but also by the increased normal death taxes collected on a base expanded by
virtue of freedom from the preceding year's income tax obligation. 140 He
further states that "there would be an acceleration in the collection of tax
from new taxpayers-those whose incomes first reached a taxable level" dur-
ing the year skipped or the years subsequent. 146 The full meaning of this point
is indicated when reference is made to a further statement by Ruml: "Any
cancellation in tax that would occur under the plan would he a cancellation
with respect only to taxpayers who are presently liable for tax. Individuals
who first become liable for tax in 1943 or subsequent years would immediately
be on a current basis and as to them there would be no possible loss in tax
receipts." 147 Consequently, the total revenue loss which would result if
the skip-a-year provision of the Rum1 plan were applied to many taxpaying
generations, is greatly diminished. Yet there is gross discrimination against
future taxpaying generations. The full impact of this discrimination is stated
by Rum1: "In 1944 a taxpayer whose 1943 income first brought him into the
taxpaying group would be liable for a tentative tax measured by his 1943
income; he would also be liable for a deficiency tax measured by his 1943
income (since he would not have returned a tentative tax in 1943)." 148 The
double burden thus imposed upon the new taxpayer is not unlike that in-
volved in the imposition of the withholding system,'149 and represents a con-
tradiction of the spirit of the plan itself.
Aside from the treatment of new taxpayers, the various suggestions offered
by Ruml meet many of the objections to the skip-a-year section of his plan.
Yet the complexities involved in their execution militate against them and
require that a more thoroughgoing variation of the skip-a-year provision be
adopted. Under one possible alternative advanced by the Treasury, involving
withholding, the obligation would be skipped only as to the normal and first
surtax brackets. For some 70 per cent of the taxpayers with net incomes less
than $2,000 there would then be no double burden.'50 And the double burden
application of the ordinary death tax levy to a larger estate base, increased by the removal
of the tax burden. Since estate taxation is on a lower plane than the income levy, the
full extent of the loss cannot be regained.
145. See note 144 supra.
146. RUmL, op. cit. supra note 129, at 30.
147. Id. at 31.
148. Id. at 30.
149. If, however, a withholding system has been in operation at the time when the
individual receives his first wage payment, the burden is reduced to the extent of with-
holding. See Senate Hearings at 187, note 19 (statement of B. Ruml oil the Pay-As-You-
Go Income Tax Plan).
150. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1942, p. 40, col. 5; N. Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1943, p. 1,
col. 1.
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on the remaining taxpaying group, a definite minority, would be minimized.
Another alternative would be to apply to 1942 income the lower rates and
higher exemptions of the 1941 tax measure.'" The 1942 tax obligation would
thus be forgiven to the extent of the difference between the 1942 and 1941
rates and exemptions. Both plans 152 have the advantage of relative simplicity
of operation, and because of their inclusive nature prevent the poss.ibility of
privilege which is present in some situations under the more selective pro-
visions of the Rural proposal. Moreover, according to Treasury calculation,.
revenue loss would be much less under these alternative proposals than under
the Ruml system' 53
The principal objection to the Ruml plan, apart from the revenue loss in-
volved in the skipped year feature and the rate lag in the permanent scheme,
is its inadequacy as a device to achieve a current system of tax payment.
Inasmuch as the payment in any one year is tentatively based on the preceding
year's income, variations in income from year to year require constant adjust-
ments, all of which must be made a year subsequent to the period in which
the income is earned.3 4 Thus if an individual's income in 1943 exceeds that
earned in 1942, a payment based on the difference must be made in 1944 in
addition to the tentative payment of the 1944 obligation. If 1943 income is
less than that earned in 1942, the taxpayer receives a credit for the difference
against his 1944 payment.
In some instances, however, the Ruml plan through certain relief provi-
sions does approximate a current system even when there have been varia-
tions in income. When after an increase in income the taxpayer dies and there
is thus a complete cessation of income, his estate is required to pay only the
adjustment and not the much larger sum representing the adjustment anti
tentative payment based on the preceding year's income. And when a varia-
tion in an individual's income during the taxable year can be anticipated, pay-
ment can be made on a current basisYa r But the administrative problems in
determining the validity of the individual's claim of variation, though less
acute in the case of an increase 1ro than in that of a decrease, limit the effect-
151. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1943, p. 18, col. 3.
152. Another approach that might be taken to this problem would involve a post-
ponement of part of the 1942 liability. See Hearinqs before Committee on Ways and
Means on a Proposal to Place Income Tax of Individuals on a Pay-As-yon-Go Basis,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 21.
153. By use of the 1941 rates and exemptions the loss would be $4,000,000,000 of the
$10,000,000,000 "which the Treasury would receive if it collected all the taxes on 1942
incomes, as against a $7,000,000,000 to $8,000,000,000 'loss' under another pay-as-you-gu
plan, which would forgive the normal and first surtax, a total uf 19 per cent, on 1942
incomes and release an estimated 30,000,000 taxpayers from the 1942 'liability.'" N. Y.
Times, Feb. 4, 1943, p. 18, col. 3.
154. If the individual, however, possessed a steady income, there would be no nece,3-
sity for any adjustment See address by Randolph E. Paul before the National Lawyer's
Guild, Treasury Dep't Release, unlisted, Sept. 26, 1942, at 7.
155. See Rum., op. cit. snpra note 129, at 25-26.
156. Ibid.
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iveness of anticipation as a means of achieving a current system of tax pay-
ment.
157
The limitations of the Ruml plan as a method of attaining the current pay-
ment objective are not applicable to the withholding at the source device.
Under the withholding system deductions from current earnings satisfy cur-
rent tax liability to the extent of the withdrawal. Thus payment of the tax
obligation is made throughout the year and a relative ease of payment not
present in the Ruml plan, as originally stated, is made possible.
The effectiveness of the withholding device in placing taxpayers on a cur-
rent basis depends on the extent of the amount withheld. At present only
the obligation created by the Victory Tax is satisfied through withholding.
It was proposed in Supplement "U" that 5 and then 10 per cent be withheld
toward the ordinary tax obligation. But even under this measure the appli-
cation of withholding would be relatively limited. It has been suggested that
withholding be employed, and the prior tax obligations forgiven, virtually
to the extent of the normal and first surtax obligation. 5 s If this were done, a
substantial portion of the taxpaying population would be placed on a coni-
pletely current basis.' 5" Those in the higher brackets would also be benefited
since a substantial portion, though not all, of their tax obligation would be met
currently by withholding and their prior tax debt would be partially, though
not entirely forgiven.
Total withholding might be applied to the entire taxpaying group by making
collection at source at progressive rates.' But in order to calculate the
amount to be withheld in each pay period, the net taxable income of the indi-
vidual would have to be known in advance since this income determines the
applicable rate. Even in a tax system predicated upon a flat levy difficulty
would arise, for when the tax liability is calculated on net taxable income,
foreknowledge of permitted deductions as well as exemptions, is necessary
to arrive at this figure. Under Supplement "U" net taxable income subject to
withholding was arbitrarily calculated by assuming ordinary deductions to
be 10 per cent of the personal exemptions. When, as in Supplement "U" and
in the plan to limit withholding to the normal and first surtax liability, only
157. Id. at 26. It is assumed that there would be little use of the declaration of an
increase of income.
15& The actual rate, however, "would be slightly lower than the sum of the normal tax
and the first bracket surtax in order to make further allowance for deductions and to
allow for vacations without pay, occasional periods of unemployment, and possible fluctua-
tions in income above and below the taxable limit." "In this way, refunds for overpayment
at the source would be held to a minimum." Hearings before Committee on Ways and
Means on a Proposal to Place Income Tax of Individuals on a Pay-As-You-Go Basis,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 12. The House Ways and Means subcommittee to study
pay-as-you-go methodology has tentatively approved a withholding rate of 20o--com-
prised of the normal and surtax rates reduced to 17%, and the 3% Victory Tax. N. Y.
Times, March 2, 1943, p. 11, col. 4.
159. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1943, p. 14, col. 2.
160. Ibid.
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part of the total tax obligation is withheld, this procedure would appear to be
sufficient to meet the difficulty. For in this case any error in the direction of
overwithholding can usually be offset against the total sum due from the
taxpayer, and refunds can be kept at a minimum by the additional 105
deduction. When, on the other hand, withholding is made applicable to the
entire tax obligation, the possibility of granting a credit against another tax
obligation does not exist, and deductions cannot be assumed with any degree of
certainty.
One possible solution to the difficulties involved in total withholding would
be to apply to withholding the mechanism of the Ruml tentative tax system.
The amount to be withheld in any one year would then be determined by the
preceding year's tax obligation with provision for changes in marital status.
Admittedly, under this plan tax payments would not be made on a completely
current basis. For amounts withheld in excess of the tax obligation would
have to be credited against the following year's withholding liability, and
deficiencies in amounts withheld would have to be added to that liability. Yet
the disadvantage in these adjustments is somewhat offset by the fact that the
taxpayer's liability, when too little has been withheld, would be spread over
the entire succeeding year, and an immediate refund could be made of sums
due the taxpayer because of excessive withholding. In addition, an adjust-
ment might be made to reduce the lack of currency when there is fluctuation
in income. The tentative payments could be predicated upon simplified quar-
terly statements of current income." " A full statement would be made at the
end of the year, the actual liability computed, and a refund or credit made
when necessary. Since the basis assumed is quarterly, the statement would be
a closer approximation of the true current income than one based on the in-
come of the preceding year. 62
There is a very superficial similarity between this withholding scheme and
one for monthly tax collections embodied in Representative Carlson's original
presentation of the Rural plan.16 3 Such collections, like withholding at the
source, would achieve the advantages of payment of tax obligations over the
year but, unlike withholding at the source, they would not forestall avoidance
or promote certainty of collection since payment would depend solely upon the
taxpayer's own initiative.0
4
161. See Hearings before Committee on Vys and Means on a Proposal to Place
Income Tax of Individuals on a Pay-As-You-Go Basis, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 15.
This quarterly statement plan has been proposed by the Treasury in a more limited sense,
as a supplement to collection at the source on wages and salaries, and would have spe-
cific application to persons "with incomes from such sources as business profits, profes-
sional fees, and farm incomes. . . ." Ibid.
162. An additional benefit resulting from the quarterly tentative tax plan is the relief
it would give those having seasonal incomes.
163. H. J. REs. 17, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 6, 1943). See 78 Co.-G. REc., Jan. 12,
1943, at 132-38, particularly at 135.
164. See Hearings before Committee on lVays and Means on a Proposal to Place
Income Tax of Individuals on a Pay-As-You-Go Basis, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 2.
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The British method of calculating wage withholdings is quite similar to that
resulting from a combination of the tentative tax device and withholding.1' 0
In England, however, the amount withheld in any half year serves to
satisfy the preceding half-year's obligation.'0 Thus tile tentative character
of the tax return is eliminated. Yet the combination of the tentative tax plan
and the withholding device would appear to be more desirable in that it syn-
chronizes the individual's tax obligation and income where use of the sug-
gested relief provisions is feasible, and also permits a cessation of income tax
demands on the estate of the deceased.' 0 7
THE IMMUNITIES DOCTRINE
When the special emphasis of a tax program includes the removal of in-
equities in the tax law as well as production of vastly greater revenue,105
thpe immunities rule giving tax exemption to holders of government bonds
must be reconsidered. With the adoption of higher tax rates, loss of revenue
from this exemption increases.'0 0 And, more important, tile attractiveness of
the device as a method of avoiding taxes is greatly enhanced. In 1913, when
the rate upon taxable income immediately above $100,000 was 5 per cent, the
saving afforded by tax-exempt bonds, bearing .2 per cent less interest than
corporate bonds, was inconsiderable.' -0 But, in 1941, when the tax rate on
that same income was 69 per cent, the amount involved was of some conse-
quence even though the differential in interest yield between corporate and
tax-exempt bonds had increased to .67 per cent. 17 ' That the device is in fact
more widely used when tax rates are higher is indicated by the increase in
the proportionate holding of tax-exempt securities in estates of $1,100,000
and over, from 6.2 per cent in 1928, to 15.1 per cent in 1940172 Since tile
165. See Comment (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 410-12.
166. See Comment (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 411.
167. Use of this mechanism would also permit withholding on income other than
that derived from wages-"business profits, professional fees, rents, and farm receipts."
Income from these diverse soprces can be tentatively taxed by reference to prior expe-
rience. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on a Proposal to Place rncome
Tax of Individuals on. a Pay-As-You-Go Basis, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 13.
168. See House Hearings at 3119; Paul, The Emergency Job of Federal Taxation
(1941) 27 CORN. L. Q. 3, 6.
169. At the rates first proposed by the Treasury in connection with the Revenue Revi-
sion of 1942, the revenue loss from tax exemption was estimated at $275,000,000; at the
1942 rate the loss was estimated at $184,000,000. See House Hearings at 3079.
170. See Table: Yields of corporate and municipal bonds, spread, and Federal indi-
vidual income tax rates, 1900-1942. House Hearings at 3091. See Table: Gross annual
yield from a taxable security equivalent to a 4-per cent yield fromn a wholly ta.x-e.xempt
security, under the tax rates in effect in 1929, 1935, and 1941, and proposed for 1942.
House Hearings at 3089.
171. See Table: Yields of corporate and municipal bonds, spread, and Federal indi-
vidual income tax rates, 1900-42. House Hearings at 3091.
172. In estates of $100,000 to $200,000 the proportionate holdings increased from
1.6% in 1928 to 3.1% in 1940; in estates of $200,000 to $300,000, from 2.3% to 3.6%; in
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federal income tax law normally imposes a progressively higher rate upon the
upper income brackets, this privilege can be profitably utilized by only a special
income group. Under the rates initially proposed by the Treasury in the Rev-
enue Revision of 1942, a yield of 4 per cent on a tax-free bond is equivalent
to a 5.56 per cent yield on a taxable security to a person in the $5,000 income
bracket, and to a 33.33 per cent yield to a person in the $100,000 bracket.1 3
Almost from the inception of the modern income tax law, these factors have
impelled recommendations for the elimination of this privilege,'" all of
which have been defeated.Y75 Because these inequities would be intensified with
the increased tax rates of the 1942 Revenue Revision, the Treasury pro-
posed taxing the interest on outstanding and future state and municipal
issues 1 76 A reciprocal right was to be conferred upon the states, hut they
were not to be permitted to tax the interest on outstanding federal issues since
the Treasury was not inclined to dishonor the pledge of tax-exemption appear-
ing on many outstanding federal obligations.'7  Congress refused to adopt
the recommended measure.178
estates from 300,000 to $500,000, from 2.71/c to 6.2i'; in estates from $500,000 t'.
$1,100,000, from 4.3% to 8.8%. See Table: State and local govennent securities as a per-
cant of gross estate, by sire classes of net estate, estate-tax returns filed in 1028-40.
House Hearings at 3087.
173. See Table: Gross annual yield from a taxable security equivalent to a 4-per cent
yield from a wholly tax-exempt security, under the tax rates in effect in 102N, 35, and
1941, and proposed for 1942. House Hearings at 30,9.
174. At first the proposals sought to tax outstanding state and municipal hbonds by
legislation: REP. SEc'Y TRAs. (1919) 24-25 (Carter Glass) ; REP. Stev TnL~s. (1920)
38 (D. F. Houston). It was then proposed that state, municipal, and federal ohsligati'.ns
to be issued be taxed by constitutional amendment: (1922) Proceedings, Fifteenth Nal.
Confcrece, NAT. TAX Assoc. 260 (Pres. Harding); REP. SyEcv*" Tnc.Es. (1927) 64-67
(Andrew W. Mellon) ; H. R. Misc. Doe. No. 229, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 5 (Pres.
Roosevelt). Reliance was again placed on legislation in 1938 and 1939 by President Roose-
velt as to future issues: H. R. 'Misc. Doe. No. 603, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1933); H. R.
Misc. Doc. No. 113, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939) 2. In the last session of Congress the
proposal sought to tax outstanding state and local obligations by legislatin. Hfouse Hear-
ings at 8.
175. See House Hearings at 1481. Yet during the Civil War income tax period the
suggestion that the interest on the obligations of the United States be exempted frum taxa-
tion was rejected. CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. (t861-62) 1530-32. And by the
Public Debt Act, 55 STAT. 9 (1941), 31 U. S. C. § 742(a) (Supp. 1941) the interest on the
obligations of the United States and its instrumentalities was placed within the compa. of
the federal income tax law.
176. See House Hearings at S.
177. Ibid. "According to the particular security issue in question, C(,ngress has sup-
plied a complete exemption of United States securities from all state or local ta.ation,
exemption from all save estate and inheritance taxes, and exemption from all ave these
and surtaxes upon income." Gardner, Tax lnumne Bonds (1940) 8 GEo. WAsh. L REV.
1200, 1210. Statutory references are found in Gardner. supra, notes 6446.
178. The Senate Finance Committee had, however, tentatively approved a tax on the
interest of state and municipal obligations to be issued in the future. X. Y. Times, Aug.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Ostensibly, one of the chief reasons for the attitude of Congress on this mat-
ter is the fear that legislation eliminating the immunities rule will be declared
unconstitutional. Stemming from McCidloch v. Maryland,1" 9 the immunities
doctrine was at one time extended by the courts to include income as remotely
removed from government as that derived from Indian oil land leased from
the United States.8 0 Recent decisions, however, have so weakened the entire
doctrine 8 as to warrant the Treasury ruling 182 that the interest upon the
25, 1942, p. 1, col. 2. Cf. § 112(c) of H. R. 7378, as reported out of the Senate Finance
Committee.
179. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819). In declaring an attempt by Maryland to tax the notes
of the United States bank unconstitutional, Marshall, C. J., stated that "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy," id. at 431, a phrase basic to most arguments against the
elimination of the immunities doctrine. See ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE STATES, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL SECURITIES (1939) 165-69.
A federal income tax imposed upon the interest from municipal obligations was held
invalid in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895), on rearyntient,
158 U. S. 601 (1895). Previously, a Charleston ordinance taxing "all personal estate"
including "bonds, notes, insurance stock, six and seven per cent stock of the United States,
or other obligations upon which interest has been or will be received during the year"
was declared invalid. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 450 (U. S.
1829). Some question has arisen whether an income tax on the interest of United States
obligations was there involved since the precise nature of the tax imposed by Charleston,
whether on property or income, is not clear. The reasoning, however, employed by Mar-
shall, C. J., in the Weston case is directed against a tax on income. See discussion and
cases cited in House Hearings at 3136-37.
180. Gillespie v. State of Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922). But see note 181 iinra.
181. The tax has been upheld when imposed upon "those who derive income or profits
from their performance of state functions as independent engineering contractors, Metcalf
& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, or from the resale of state bonds, Willcuts v. Bunt,
282 U. S. 216; those engaged as lessees of the state in producing oil from state lands
I Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279; .. .Helvering v. Mountain Pro-
ducers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, overruling Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S.
393. Similarly federal taxation of property transferred at death to a state or one of its
municipalities was upheld in Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U. S. 249, ef. Greiner v. Llewellyn,
258 U. S. 384. . . .A federal excise tax on corporations, measured by income, including
interest received from state bonds, was upheld in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S.
107, 162 et seq.; see National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508, 527. . ."
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938), n. 6. In the Gerhardt case a tax upon the
salaries of a state instrumentality was upheld, and subsequently it was declared that
the salaries of government (both federal and state) officers and employees may be
taxed. Graves v. New York ex -reL O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939). The grant of immu-
nity to income from patents and royalties in Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142 (1928)
was withdrawn in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932), overruling the Rock-
wood case. A sales tax imposed upon a Government cost-plus-a-fixed fee contractor was
upheld in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941). And when a state instru-
mentality is deemed to be engaged in non-governmental functions, the power to tax has
even been extended to its revenues. See note 201 infra.
182. See Treasury Dep't Release No. 24-3, March 14, 1941, 4 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed.
Tax Serv. 1166,178. Similar action was subsequently taken against the bondholders of
the Triborough Bridge Authority. Treasury Dep't Release No. 26-63, July 16, 1941, 4
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obligations of the Port of New York Authority be included within gross in-
come under Section 22(a) 8 3 of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus a test case 1s,
-has been initiated, intended "ultimately to prove . . . that the Federal Gov-
ernment has the right . . . to tax the income from state and municipal se-
curities." 185 Since a judicial decision favorable to the government would
obviously be of enormous assistance in any future attempt to secure the desired
legislation, the full implications of the case are worthy of consideration.
The most immediate question raised by the Treasury ruling is the power of
the Federal Government to tax these obligations despite Section 22(b) (4),
which excludes from gross income "the obligations of a State, Territory, or
any political subdivision thereof." 180 In order to sustain the Treasury action
as not coming within the statutory proscription, the courts must first con-
sider the particular nature of the issuing body and its obligations. Conse-
quently, when the case comes before the courts, it is possible that the problem
of the general constitutional immunity of state and municipal bond interest
will not be considered.' 8 7
In order to avoid the statutory exclusion, a distinction might be drawn
between the Port Authority and what is usually considered a political sub-
Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 66,334. Since Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405
(1938) there had been a good deal of conjecture as to whether the interest on the Port
Authority's bonds might be taxed. See comments concerning such a possibility by Sena-
tor Brown, Hearings Before Special Committee oil Taxation of Goennienlal Securities
and Salaries on S. R. 303, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 51, and testimony as to the un-
constitutionality of such action by Port Authority representatives, Spccial Commillce
Hearings, supra at 473-506 (Mir. Julius Cohen) and 248-59 (Mr. Frank Ferguson).
183. "'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from . . . interest,
rent, dividends, securities .. . or gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever." § 22(a).
184. Isidore NV. Shamberg, Adm'r v. Commissioner, B. T. A. Docket No. 107713
(involving the interest on the obligations of the Port of New York Authority). The
interest on the obligations of the Triborough Bridge Authority is involved in Estate of
Caroline Vhite v. Commissioner, B. T. A. Docket No. 10S930.
185. Treas. Dep't Release No. 24-3, March 14, 1941, 4 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax
Serv. g66,178. As opposed to its present position, the Treasury stated in the release
that "the present action represents no change in the Administration's policy of seeking
to tax only the future issues of State and municipal securities:' In accordance with that
stated policy the Treasury announced its intention, should the tax be upheld, to "renew
its recommendation to Congress to (1) abate the payment of back taxes, (2) to exempt
outstanding issues from taxation, and (3) to begin the taxation of future issues." Treas.
Dep't Release No. 24-3, supra. Although the Treasury is now seeking to tax the interest
on outstanding issues, it is hoped that its policy concerning the abatement of back
taxes is unchanged. The financial dislocation resulting from an exercise of the right,
which would be raised by the hoped-for decision, to collect taxes upon income nt as-
sessed within the past three years, under § 275 (a), makes desirable the same action of
abatement taken when the salaries of government officials were declared subject to tax.
Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 575-77, 26 U. S. C. § 22 (1940).
186. Section 22(b) (4).
187. See testimony to that effect by Randolph E. Paul, House Hearings at 3134.
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division of a state. The P6rt Authority is actually a creature of the Federal
Government as well as of the states involved,18 8 and its nature is therefore
inconsistent with the term "political subdivision of a state." 180 Though cre-.
ated by compact between New York and New Jersey, 00 it received its ulti-
mate sanction by an act of Congress 191 in which it was declared that "the
right to alter, amend, or repeal this resolution is . . . expressly reserved." 191
Moreover, by the terms of the compact itself Congress has the express right
to endow the Port Authority with such additional powers as it deems fit.'0 3
And the states cannot enact any legislation repudiating or contradicting the
terms of the compact. 194
Another method of avoiding the statutory exclusion rests on the contention
that the majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Stone, in Helering v.
Gerhardt,19" declared that the Port Authority was engaged in a proprietary
or non-governmental function in holding a federal tax on the salaries of the
employees of this agency valid. The fundamental rationale of the Court in
that case was that the tax would not interfere with an essential state function
and was "but a necessary incident to the co-existence within the same organ-
188. "Politically, the port is split between the law-making of two states, independent
but futile in their respective spheres." "In addition, the United States has been asserting
its guardianship over interstate and foreign commerce. What in fact was one, in law was
many. Plainly the situation could not be adequately dealt with except through the co-
ordinated efforts of New York, New Jersey, and the United States." Frankfurter and
Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjushnents
(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 685, 697.
189. An essentially similar argument was put before the Court by the Government
in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938). It was there contended that the Port
Authority "cannot be said to be an instrumentality of the States such that taxation of its
employees by the United States is forbidden by the Constitution." Petition for Certiorari
by the United States, p. 25, Helvering v. Gerhardt, sispra. The Court, however, did not
address itself to this point since such a narrow rationale was not necessary for approval
of the federal power to tax even the salaries of the employees of the states themselves.
There is, however, greater likelihood of such an argument being expressly considered
in the instant case since a narrow determination of the character of the agency itself
must be made in order to circumvent statutory exclusion.
190. N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 154; N. J. Laws 1921, c. 151.
191. 42 STAT. 174 (1921). "No state shall, without the Consent of Congress,
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State ... " U. S. CoNsT. AlT. 1,
§10.
192. 42 STAT. 174, 180 (1921) §2.
193. ". . . And such other and additional powers as shall be conferred upon it by
the legislature of either State concurred in by the legislature of the other, or by Act or
Acts of Congress. . . ." (italics added). 42 STAT. 174, 176 (1921) art. 3.
194. See Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. Rxv. 76, 80-87; Delaware River Comm. v. Col-
burn, 310 U. S. 419 (1940) ; Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U. S. 92 (1938); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518
(U. S. 1851) ; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1823).
195. 304 U. S. 405 (1938).
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ized government of the two taxing sovereigns . .. " 19" In upholding the
tax the Court considered the effect of Article 643, Regulation 77, under the
1932 Revenue Act, which exempted from federal taxation salaries paid by a
state "or political subdivision thereof for services rendered in connection with
the exercise of an essential governimental function of the State or political sub-
division." 19- The Court thought it "plain that employees of the Port Author-
ity are not employees of the state or a political subdivision thereof within
the meaning of the regulation. . . ." 198 In the light of this statement and of
the extensive discussion in the opinion of the distinction between governmen-
tal and proprietary functions as a basis for exception to the immunities rule,1'9
it might be maintained that the Court held the Port Authority was not engaged
in a governmental function. But the Court clearly stated that it was express-
ing no opinion as to whether a federal tax could be imposed on the income
of the Port Authority and that it was deciding "only that the present tax
neither precludes nor threatens unreasonably to obstruct any function essential
to the continued existence of the state government." 200 Yet a tax could clearly
be imposed on the Port Authority's income if it had been actually held to le
engaged in a proprietary function.20 1 Because of the Court's declaration limit-
ing its decision, it has been said,202 subsequent to the Gerhardt case, that
196. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 424 (1938).
197. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art 643. (Italics added). If the pertinent regulation had
read "in connection with the exercise of an essential governmental function for the state,'
it would have been open to the interpretation that the employees alone were not engaged in
governmental function, thereby excluding an interpretation referring to the Port Author-
ity's nature.
198. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 423 (1938). The Court had previously
pointed out that the "applicable provisions of § 116 of the 1932 Act do not authorize the
exclusion from gross income of the salaries of employees of a state or a state-owned cor-
poration." Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra at 423. Nevertheless the Court went on to con-
sider the regulation as though authorized. Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra at 423.
Compare letter of Julius Cohen, General Counsel of the Port Authority, to the
Chairman of the Port Authority, Hearings Before Special Commitlee on Taxation of
Governmental Securities and Salaries, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 497.
199. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 418-19 (1938).
200. Id. at 424.
201. One of the "two guiding principles of limitation for holding the tax immunity
of state instrumentalities to its proper function" is "dependent upon the nature of the
function being performed by the state or in its behalf, [and] excludes from the immunity
activities thought not to be essential to the preservation of state governments even though
the tax be collected from the state treasury." Id. at 419, citing South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905) ; Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934) ; and Helvering
v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). See also Allen v. Regents of the University System of
Georgia, 304 U. S. 439 (1938).
202. See Howell v. The Port of New York Authority, 34 F. Supp. 797 (D. N. J.
1940) ; Voorhis et al v. Cornell Contracting Corp. & The Port of New York Authority,
170 Misc. 908, 912-13, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 378 (N. Y. City Cts. 1938). See letter of
Julius Cohen, General Counsel of the Port Authority, to the Chairman of the Port Au-
thority, Hearings Before Special Committee on Taxation of Gorenenmenlal Securities ard
Salaries, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 493-98. Prior to Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S.
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the Port Authority is engaged in a governmental function. It would seem
apparent, however, that the Court was reluctant to decide the question,
for a decision as to the nature of the Port Authority was not necessary to
conclude the issue presented in the case, and, if made, might have led to liti-
gation concerning the constitutionality of a tax on the employees of a state
agency actually engaged in governmental function. Nevertheless the statement
of the Court concerning the scope of the regulation can be construed as
intimating strongly that the Port Authority is engaged in a proprietary fune-
tion.
It may be asserted that even though the Port Authority is so engaged it
does not necessarily come within the statutory exclusion because Section
22(b) (4) does not differentiate between governmental and non-governniental
function. But this argument leads to the strange conclusion that although
under the Gerhardt case a tax can be imposed on the salaries of the employees
and perhaps the income of a state instrumentality engaged in a non-govern-
mental function, the interest on its bonds is exempt. And section 22(b) (4)
does not appear to have been designed as a special grant of privilege to bond-
holders.
Should the Port Authority be found as proprietary in character, great
weight would be given to yet another argument designed to avoid the statu-
tory exclusion, namely, that the particular subdivision was not political in
nature.20- 3 The criteria 204 used in determining whether a particular subdivi-
405 (1938) the general functions of the Port Authority were considered by the weight of
authority as governmental. Commissioner v. Ten Eyck, 76 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935). But see Petition for Certiorari by the United States, passim, Helvering v. Ger-
hardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938), where counsel adduces economic data concerning the spe-
cific activity of the Port Authority in an attempt to prove it non-governmental in func-
tion.
203. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 22(b) (4)-1 (1938) stating that the "term 'po-
litical subdivision,' within the meaning of the exemption, denotes any division of the
State or Territory which is a municipal corporation, or to which has been delegated the
right to exercise part of the sovereign power of the State or Territory. As thus defined,
a political subdivision of a State or Territory may or may not, for the purpose of exemp-
tion, include special assessment districts so created, such as . . . harbor, port improve-
ment, and similar districts and divisions of a State or Territory." Previously the applica-
ble regulation stated that these subdivisions "may" be construed as within the statutory
exclusion. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 22(b) (4)-1 (1934). And earlier the regulation
stated that the term "political subdivision" "includes" harbor and port improvements, U. S.
Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 84 (1932). (Italics added in all cases). Thus the metamorphosis of
the Treasury's general position is clear, culminating in the present action. Its specific
view of the Port Authority's status does not appear to have been taken until after Hel-
vering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938) as is evidenced in a letter to Commissioner
Robert Moses in reference to the Triborough Bridge Authority in 1937, subsequent to tile
issuance of Regulation 86 (may include), voicing the opinion that the Bridge Authority
is, in effect, a political subdivision of the state. 3 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. 6294
(Feb. 17, 1937). See GOLDBERG, TAX IMMUNITY AND THE REVENUiE BOND (1940) 17.
204. Concerning the characteristics of a political subdivision, the court, in Lydecker
v. Drainage and Water Commissioners of the Township of Englewood, 41 N, J. L. 154,
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sion is political in character are just as varied and confused as those which
are used to determine whether the instrumentality is engaged in such business
activity as make it proprietary and non-governmental in nature. " And the
sum of the factors which might lead a court to conclude that the instrumen-
tality is proprietary in nature might easily lead the same court to believe that
it is also nonpolitical. Yet the contention that the Port Authority is non-
political in character does not depend on the determination that it is engaged
in non-governmental functions. The fact that the Port Authority, though em-
bracing a specific area,20 6 "is not an incorporation of its inhabitants" and that
"the persons who inhabit the port district have no direct right to vote with
respect to the activities of the authority" 20 might be sufficient to render it
non-political and prevent statutory exclusion.2us
Because of the possibility of avoiding the statutory exclusion on any one
of these grounds,209 the Port Authority case might well be decided without
157 (1879) stated that the "distinctive marks are . . . that they embrace a certain terri-
tory and its inhabitants . . . ; that their chief design is the exercise of governmental
functions, and that the electors residing within each is, to some extent, committed to the
power of local government, to be wielded . . . for the peculiar benefit of the people there
residing." In Muddy Creek Drainage District v. C. A. Webb & Co., 160 N. C. 594, 76
S. E. 552 (1912) the court held the bonds of the drainage district not exempt from taxa-
tion since that unit does not possess any taxing power itself-the court assuming that
when this power exists, the taxation of the district's bonds is useless since added interest
cost would then be raised by taxation. But see Caldwell v. Little River Drainage District,
291 Mo. 72, 236 S. AV. 15 (1921). See cases collected in Note 108 A. L. R. 577; (1939)
1 LA. L. REv. 626. Cf. Bear Gulch Water Co. v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 975 (C. C. A.
9th, 1941).
205. See 38 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 563, 565 (1937): "... the term 'Political subdivision'
may be used in statutes in more than one sense. It may designate a true governmental
subdivision such as a county, township, etc., or, as held in the Attorney General's opinion
under consideration, it may have a broader meaning, denoting any subdivision of the
state created for a public purpose although authorized to exercise a portion of the sover-
eign power of the state only to a limited degree." And the distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary function has been referred to as creating "a zone of debatable
ground within which cases must be put upon one side or the other of the line by what
this court has called the gradual process of historical and judicial 'inclusion and exclu-
sion.'" Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 365 (1937).
206. 42 STAT. 174, 175 (1921) art. 1. It is to be noted that the action against the
Triborough Bridge Authority has no impediment in this regard since territorial juris-
diction was not conferred on the Bridge Authority. N. Y. Laws, 1933, c. 145.
207. Howell v. The Port of New York Authority, 34 F. Supp. (D. N. J. 1940)
797, 800 (where, however, the court upheld the Port Authority's immunity to suit since
it was deemed to be engaged in a governmental function).
208. In addition, the Port Authority's lack of taxing power might be invoked. Cf.
Muddy Creek Drainage District v. C. A. Webb & Co., 160 N. C. 594, 76 S. F. 552
(1912).
209. A more remote possibility for use in avoiding the statutory exclusion rests upon
the revenue bond hypothesis. "A revenue bond may be defined as a bond issued by a gov-
ernmental body in connection with the acquisition, construction or improvement of a
publicly owned revenue-producing project, or in connection with the retirement of a debt
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reference to the constitutionality of the immunities rule. Serious doubt is,
therefore, cast on its utility as a test case. Under present statutory declaration,
however, this question can be brought before the courts in no other way, and
so it is hoped that they will at least advert to the broad constitutional issue.210
The willingness of the United States Supreme Court to uphold a tax on the
interest from government obligations is indicated in a series of decisions im-
pairing the scope and application of the immunities rule. The most pertinent
of these decisions are those rendered in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe,211 in which a state tax on an employee or officer of the national gov-
ernment was sustained, and Alabama v. King and Boozer,21 2 in which a sales
tax on a contractor holding a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract from the Federal
Government was declared valid despite the resulting cost increase to that Gov-
ernment. The reasoning used in these cases is clearly applicable to the bond
interest issue. A tax on bond interest is imposed on the income of the bond-
holder and is not to be considered as resting upon the source of that income.
And though the tax may result in added cost to the issuing government, this
fact alone is not decisive of the constitutional question. Indeed, if the King
and Boozer case were strictly followed, the Court would not even consider the
element of cost but would look only to the legal incidence of the tax which
incurred for such a project, and payable as to both principal and interest only from the
revenues of the project." FOWLER, REvENUE BONDS (1938) 2. The bonds of the Port
Authority are apparently within the definition's ambit. See GOLDBERG, op. cit. supra note
203 passin. Cases involving revenue bonds when the statutory exclusion was avoided
are predicated upon the proposition that the liability raised by the bonds falls upon some
particular individuals who are assessed as benefiting from the particular improvement
made. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, Sec. 19.22(b) (4)-1 (1940) ; Stoner v. Commissioner, 37
B. T. A. 249 (1938) ; Standard Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 156 (1937).
When, however, the municipality creating the special assessment district undertakes such
a relatively minor function as the collection and disbursement of the assessment, the bond
is considered the municipality's obligation even though it is expressly stipulated that the
bond is payable exclusively from the assessment. Bryant v. Commissioner, 111 F. (2d)
9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940). The Port Authority does undertake to collect the funds from
those who might be analogized to those assessed, the tollpayers. But more important is
the fact that all sources of revenue of the Port Authority are pledged against the bonds.
It can therefore hardly be said that the obligation does not fall on the Port Authority.
GOLDBRG, supra at 15. Should, by some legerdemain, the bonds be declared as one of that
type and thus without the statutory exclusion, a pyrrhic victory would be won by the
Treasury inasmuch as all possibility of this action's being a test case would be defeated. The
obligations involved would then be construed as not even being those of the Port Authority.
210. The rule adopted by the Court "never to formulate a rule broader than is re-
quired by the precise facts to which it is to be applied," Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co.
v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33. 39 (1885) [quoted with approval by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936)), is not necessarily a bar to reasoning broad enough to indicate
here the Court's position on the constitutional question. In this manner the constitutionality
of a tax upon the interest of the obligations of the states and municipalities would be
sufficiently determined for the purposes of Congressional debate.
211. 306 U. S. 466 (1939), 33 ILL L. REv. 962.
212. 314 U. S. 1 (1941), (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 482.
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is upon the bondholder.2 1a Yet a Court conscious of economic realities would
hardly employ this highly conceptualistic formula.
It is more probable that, in considering the constitutionality of the tax,
the Court would inquire into its economic consequences to determine whether
government function would be destroyed by the economic burden resulting
from it. Varying estimates 2 1 4 have been made as to the extent of that burden.
Economists employed by the states have estimated the cost to the states would
ultimately be $175,000,000.215 Yet even assuming the validity of these esti-
mates 210 the cost which would be shared by states, municipalities, and their
instrumentalities is not such an imposing figure as to result in a general de-
struction of government function. In the individual instance it is, no doubt,
true that the increased cost, when taken in conjunction with other, perhaps
more relevant, factors, may discourage some particular government under-
taking. But in view of the indefinite number of these cases and the indeter-
minacy of the causal factors in any abandonment of government functions, it
hardly seems probable that the Court, in considering the constitutionality of
a tax on the interest from government obligations, would disregard its pre-
vious statements that individual hardship will not defeat general legislation. -21"
Moreover, the fact that this tax would constitute the withdrawal of a privilege
rather than the imposition of a burden unlike that borne by other economic
units 2181 would tend to discredit any objection based upon the hardship thesis.
213. See Note (1942) 51 YAImn L. J. 482, 483.
214. Concerning the states' estimate of the increased interest cost, Mr. H. Lutz, econo-
mist opposing the elimination of immunity, stated that "it can only be approximated by
dimensions which are indicated by the present spread [between certain classes of private
issues and government bonds]." "That, at any-rate, is the best manner of approaching this
subject I have been able to devise." Senate Hearings at 557 (statement of H. Lutz, Pro-
fessor of Public Finance, Princeton University). Similar expressions of the difficulty of
estimating the measure of increased cost have been made by Treasury representatives.
See House Hearings at 3105.
215. See Senate Hearings at S62 (brief submitted by H. Lutz, Professor of Public Fi-
nance, Princeton University). Mr. Lutz' estimate is arrived at by multiplying the out-
standing state and local debt by .9 per cent. Since the added interest cost is effective
upon the issuing body in the future when new bonds are issued, the attainment of the
$175,000,000 figure must wait until new evidences of state and local indebtedness equal
the present outstanding figure. Present estimates place the length of time required for
total refunding operations at approximately 50 years. See Table: Estimated maturities
of State and local government securities outstanding June 30, 1941. House Hearings at
3092.
216. See House Hearings at 3104. See discussion of the Treasury's statistical meth-
ods and critique of those used by state economists, Hearings Before Special Committee
on Taxation of Governmental Securities and Salaries, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) at
618-46 (statement of H. C. Murphy, Principal Economic Analyst, Div. of Research and
Stat, Treas. Dep't).
217. See Pierce Oil Co. v. City of Hope, 248 U. S. 498, 500 (1919); Purity Extract
and Tonic Co. v. Lyvnch, 226 U. S. 192, 204 (1912).
218. See Stone, J., dissenting in National Life Insurance Cu. v. United States, 277
U. S. 508, 536 (1928). See majority opinion in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405,
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If the immunities rule were abolished, an additional source of revenue would
be given the states, for they would have the right to tax interest payments on
federal obligations. The amount of revenue received from the exercise of this
right would in many states be limited because of the uneven distribution of
federal securities and the restricted use of the income tax device.219 Munici-
palities would derive no benefit from the reciprocal right to tax 220 unless
special distributive arrangements were undertaken by the states to share the
additional payments. 2 2' And under the recommendation submitted by the
Treasury, which confines the reciprocal right to tax to the interest on future
federal issues,22 2 the possibility of revenue increases would be further curtailed.
Once a tax on the interest from a state obligation were upheld, there would
appear to be no reason for considering complete reciprocity unconstitutional.
In upholding taxes on the salaries of both federal and state officials, the Su-
preme Court has already refused to distinguish between the federal and state
governments with respect to immunities.2 2 3 The supremacy which the Federal
Government has enjoyed under the immunities rule has been based on the
power of Congress to declare a federal agency immune from taxation 224 and
on the assumption that all federal activities, regardless of their actual charac-
ter, are governmental in nature.2 2 5 Congressional power to declare federal
agencies immune from taxation would be surrendered by legislation com-
pletely abandoning the immunities doctrine, and the assumption that all fed-
cral activities are governmental would be rendered irrelevant by a broad judi-
cial declaration that state bonds could constitutionally be taxed regardless of
the governmental-proprietary distinction.
Since an express statement of immunity by the Federal Government would
unquestionably be upheld by the Supreme Court, 2 2  the states could not tax
421 (1938) (emphasizing the fact that the tax there considered would merely put state
officers on an equal tax plane with the rest of the community).
219. See Hearings Before Special Committee on Ta.xation of Government Securities
and Salaries, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 126-29.
220. "It was shown that 63% of the state and local debt consists of municipal debt and
that a similar percentage of increased interest cost would have to be borne by the city
governments which do not levy income taxes and which could gain nothing from the
taxation of federal securities to offset the added cost." Id. at 131.
221. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. (1911) § 1087m-23.
222. See note 177 supra.
223. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939) (federal); Hel-
vering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938) (state).
224. See Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95 (1941).
Cf. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 33 (1939).
225. See Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 102
(1941).
226. The ability of the Federal Government to waive statutory exemption once the
basis of a constitutional right to reciprocity has been established, must be distinguished
from the ability of the Federal Government to waive constitutional immunity. See Note
(1942) 52 YALE L. J. 482, 488-89. In Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 585 (U. S.
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outstanding federal issues unless the statutory exemption presently accorded
them were abolished. If the statutory exemption were considered contractual,
its repeal might be declared unconstitutional. For although the Constitution
specifically prohibits only state action abrogating contract rights,-- T a federal
statute breaching federal contractual obligations to an individual has been
called invalid as contravening the Fifth Amendment.-228 And in an action be-
tween a state and an individual holding a federal obligation, the federal right
to invoke its sovereign immunity to suit 229 is of no avail.
Although many statements are found to the effect that a declaration of
exemption as to outstanding issues is contractual, it is questionable whether
it should be so considered. In Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Pow crs-0 a
state statute provided "that the rate of taxation fixed by this act or any other
law of this State shall not apply to any railway . . . hereafter building and
operating a line of railroad within this State . . . [in a designated area] for
the full period of ten years. . . ." 21 The petitioning railroad came within
the excluded group and presumably relied on this grant of privilege in start-
ing its operations. The Court, nevertheless, upheld a state tax subsequently
applied, saying that "the legislature is not making promises, but framing a
scheme of public revenue and improvement." "It simply indicates a course of
conduct to be pursued, until circumstances or its views of policy change. It
would be quite intolerable if parties not expressly addressed were to be al-
lowed to set up a contract on the strength of their interest in and action on
the faith of a statute, merely because their interest was obvious and their
action likely, on the face of the law."m!2 A similar statement could be made
as to tax exemption in federal obligations. The exclusion is merely declara-
tory of federal policy in one particular period and is subject to change under
changed circumstances. And the Federal Government has not forever pre-
1865) the Court expressly stated that "as it respects a subject-matter over which Con-
gress and the States may exercise a concurrent power, but from the exercise of which
Congress, by reasons of its paramount authority, my exclude the States, there is no
doubt Congress may withhold the exercise of that authority and leave the States free to
act." Therefore, national bank stock, in the absence of specific statutory exemption, was
declared to be taxable.
227. U. S. CoxsT., ARr. I, § 10.
228. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934) ; United States v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 256 U. S. 51 (1921) ; see Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935); Sinking
Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718-19 (1878). See Hart, The Gold Clause In United States
Bonds (1935) 48 ILAnv. L. Rnv. 1057, 1067.
229. See 49 STAT. 939 (1935) § 2 providing an exception to the Tucker Act, 28 U. S.
C. § 250(1) (1940), which waives federal immunity to suit on a contract. See De Gro)t
v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 432 (U. S. 1866).
230. 191 U. S. 379 (1903). See West Wisconsin Ry. v. Supervisors. 93 L. S. 595
(1876).
231. Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 384 (1903).
232. Id. at 387.
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cluded an exercise of the sovereign power of taxation by once granting a
privilege of exemption.
The contention that the removal of the statutory exemption would be a
breach of faith, though no contractual obligation were breached, does not
appear persuasive. For a retention of the exemption protects a privilege at
the expense of the states, and can therefore be interpreted as an act of bad
faith toward them.23 3 It is true that federal bonds are not used as a tax avoid-
ance device to the degree that state and local bond purchases are employed
since state income taxation is a relatively unimportant tax measure. On the
other hand, this fact indicates a proportionately diminished reliance upon
the tax immunity granted in federal bonds.
JOINT RETURNS
In the attempt to augment 'revenue and to eliminate tax privilege to the
greatest possible degree, concerted efforts were made to include a provision
for mandatory joint returns in the 1942 Revenue Revision.2 3 4 Under such
a provision family income would be treated as a tax unit, thereby making
higher surtax rates applicable. The tax advantage presently possessed by resi-
dents of community property states 23, would be destroyed. When local
property law grants certain equities to one spouse in the property of the other,
federal tax law treats the income of one member of the family unit as going
to husband and wife in equal parts,2 36 thereby diminishing surtax rates. A man-
datory joint returns provision, however, would reconstruct the income from
its component parts, and nullify the effect, for tax purposes, of the community
property laws. And it would operate in the same way on the income of those
not living in community property states. Thus attempts to achieve the results
of the community property laws through such private action as term trusts,
family partnerships and outright gifts of income producing property, would
be thwarted.
233. Compare Senate Hearings at 544-45 (statement of A. J. Tobin, Secretary, Con-
ference on State Defence) in which a previous assertion of complete immunity of federal
issues from state taxation was severely criticized. The same criticism might be applied
upon a partial exercise of superior immunity.
234. See House Hearings at 9-10. It was estimated that approximately $300,000,000
would accrue from a joint returns provision, varying with the scope of the surtax rates.
House Hearings at 10.
235. "In the group of decisions headed by Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 51 S. Ct.
58 (1930), the Court held that the income of a marital community in the eight states
with community property laws (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas, and Washington) is taxable one-half to each spouse." MAoILL AND
MAGUIRE, CASES ON TAXATIOx (1940) 774. Individuals in Oklahoma can now adopt the
community property system by election. OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1941) tit. 32, §§ 51-
65.
236. See note 235 supra.
[Vol. 52: 355
19431 ASPECTS OF PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 395
Legislation proposed 23 earlier in connection with the family tax problem
was directed at eliminating the tax privilege of residents of community
property states.2 s Income from property jointly owned under state law was
to be taxed to the individual with the management and control of it. Income
from property not jointly owned 23 was not, however, to be subject to the
management and control test and was, therefore, to be taxed to the separate
owner. The income of property purchased with separate funds was to be sinli-
larly treated. And income earned by an individual, even though considered
community property under state law,240 was to be taxed to that individual.
By these measures the purpose of the proposed legislation would have been
achieved. But the objective itself was inadequate. Among the advantages
of the mandatory joint return over this kind of legislation, as suggested by
Professor Covey Oliver, are the greater revenue it would produce and its ad-
ministrative and structural simplicity.2 41  Legislation specifically directed
against the community property laws would merely remove a tax advantage
conferred by statute. And well advised individuals in community property
states could still retain their tax advantage through the private transactions
employed in non-community property states. The mandatory joint return, on
the other hand, eliminates in all states any possibility of tax avoidance by
means of transfers between husband and wife.
Although the mandatory joint returns proposal was not emphasized in
Congress until 1934,242 its use as a method of increasing revenue and mini-
mizing tax avoidance was recognized long before then. Wisconsin, in 1911,
enacted a provision 243 by which its tax was computed on the combined income
of all members of the family except children 18 years of age and over. In
sustaining the validity of the provision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court laid
particular emphasis upon the "opportunities for fraud and evasion of the law,
which the close relationship of husband and wife or parent and child makes
possible, if not easy." 244 But after a period of twenty years during which both
the statute and holding went unchallenged,2 45 the United States Supreme
237. See Oliver, Community Property and the Taxation of Family Income (1942)
20 TEx. L. Rv. 545-46.
238. See H. R. RaP. No. 1203, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
239. See Oliver, supra note 237, at 546.
240. "The earned-income provision, in general, operates to prevent discrimination
against the community property states, for otherwise a wife's income in California, for
example, might be taxed to the husband under the management and control test even
though in a non-community state he would not have tu pay the tax on her salary." Ibid.
241. Id. at 561.
242. See Hearings before the Joint Committee on Tax Easio, and A,oidance, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 309.
243. See XVis. STAT. (1929) § 71.05(2) (d); Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134
N. NV. 673 (1912) (upholding the original provision).
244. Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 513, 134 N. NV. 673. 691 (1912), quoted with
approval in Hoeper v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 202 Wis. 493, 233 N. W. 100 (1930).
245. Hoeper v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 202 Wis. 493, 233 N. NV. 100 (1930).
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Court held the Wisconsin provision unconstitutional in Hoepcr v. Tax Com-
mission.
240
It is questionable, however, whether the present Court would follow this
ruling. A simple variation from the Wisconsin statute might be sufficient
to remove the onus of unconstitutionality placed upon the mandatory joint
return by Mr. Justice Roberts. The statute considered in the Hoeper case,
like the provision for a voluntary joint return now contained in the federal
statute,247 made liability for the tax joint and several. If, however, this lia-
bility were several, 248 a proposal for mandatory joint returns might avoid
the opprobrium of the Hoeper case.249 But the question of the constitution-
ality of such a provision is complicated by the fact that the Wisconsin statute
did allow for several liability upon application of the husband and wife.250 The
case, nevertheless, could still be distinguished on the basis of the overt action
required 251 to attain the division of responsibility. Yet Mr. Justice Roberts's
statement that "any attempt . . . to measure the tax on one person's property
or income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment"20 2 can hardly
be distinguished away.
Prospective approbation of the proposal by the Court is, nevertheless, sug-
gested by its changed attitude on tax matters. Even in the absence of specific
legislative action, the present Court has constantly narrowed the possibilities
of tax avoidance through intra-familial transfers. Employing Section 22(a),
which is merely a generalized statement of income, the Court, in Lucas v.
Earl,253 held income earned by an individual taxable to him even though half
of it immediately vested by contract in his wife. Some of the lower courts
246. 284 U. S. 206 (1931).
247. Section 51(b).
248. See Senate Hearings at 32.
249. See Lowndes, Rate an& Measure in Jurisdiction to Tax-Afteniath of Maxwell
v. Bugbee (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 756, 772-73.
250. "Married persons living together as husband and wife may make separate returns
or join in a single joint return. In either case the tax shall be computed on the combined
average taxable income. The exemptions provided for in subsection (2) of section 71.05
shall be allowed but once and divided equally and the amount of tax due shall be paid by
each in the proportion that the average income of each bears to the combined average
income." Wis. STAT. (1929) § 71.09 (d) (c). Section 71.05(2) (d) provided that "in
computing taxes and the amount of taxes payable by persons residing together as mem-
bers of a family, the income of the wife and the income of each child under eighteen
years of age shall be added to that of the husband or father, or if he be not living, to
that of the head of the family and assessed to him except as hereinafter provided." "The
taxes levied shall be payable by such husband or head of the family, but if not paid by
him may be enforced against any person whose income is included within the tax compu-
tation." (Italics added).
251. Ibid.
252. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206, 215 (1931).
253. 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
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interpreted the Earl case as merely stating the right to tax when income
can be controlled by the donor through his undertaking or refusing to under-
take those activities which give rise to it.254 But in Helvering v. Horst,
the Supreme Court held income taxable to its assignor even though the right
to income required no further action on his part. The Court's construction
of the Earl case was restated in Helvcring v. EIubalik,2'0 and swiftly re-
affirmed in Harrison v. Schaffner.a' 17 Again employing Section 22(a) the
Court, in Helvering v. Clifford,258 upheld a tax on the grantor of a five-year
irrevocable trust over which he possessed considerable powers of management
and a reversionary interest in the corpus. Not the least of the factors impelling
the Court to sustain the tax was the identity of the cestui, the grantor's spouse.
A case involving a mandatory joint return could be distinguished from these
cases upholding taxes on income directly accruing to another. In these cases,
the right to the income was, at one time, at the command of the individual
taxed. Under a mandatory joint return statute, on the other hand, the tax
rate is calculated on income never in the possession of the taxpayer. The pos-
sible importance of this distinction is enhanced in view of the emphasis placed
in the Horst,259 Evbank,2' 60 and Schaffncr 201 cases on the power and gratifica-
tion derived in the disposition of income. In addition, the Court has specifically
failed to overrule Blair v. Cominissioner,0 2 where an assignment was made
of part of a life interest in an income producing trust. The Court, in refusing to
uphold the tax, stated that an outright gift had been made of "an equitable
254. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Ross, 83 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936); Rossmore
v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Lowery v. Helvering, 76 F. (2d)
713 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. die:d.
285 U. S. 552 (1932) ; Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolu-
tion of the Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 213, 240, notes 143, 144. Cf. Bishop
v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; Van Meter v. Commissioner, 61
F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
255. 311 U. S. 112 (1940).
256. 311 U. S. 122 (1940).
257. 312 U. S. 579 (1941).
258. 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
259. ". . . Income is 'realized' by the assignor because he, who owns or controls the
source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have received
himself and diverts the payment from himself as the means of procuring the satisfaction
of his wants." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 116-17 (1940).
260. By reference to the Horst opinion, Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 125
(1940).
261. After referring to Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940) and Helvering v.
Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940) the Court said, "Decision in these cases rested on
the principle that the power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it and
that the exercise of the power to procure its payment to another, whether to pay a debt
or to make a gift, is within the reach of the statute taxing income 'derived from any
source whatever.'" Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579, 580 (1941).
262. 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
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interest in the corpus of the property .. ,, 203 Thus the precise circumstances
under which a tax can be successfully imposed after an intra-familial transfer
are unknown and the subject of an enormous amount of litigation.2 4
Yet the mandatory joint return with several liability is just as distinguish-
able from the facts in Blair v. Commissioner as from those in the Horst case.
Unlike the tax in the Blair case, the joint return does not attempt to tax one
individual on income earned by another or resulting from another's property.
The joint return is merely a device for calculating the rate to be imposed on
the taxed individual's own income. Since fear of tax evasion through intra-
familial transfers has been instrumental in sustaining a tax upon what is
another person's direct income, it may be supposed that this same policy would
provide a reasonable basis of classification 265 for tax rate changes under a
joint return. Additional justification for this classification is the fact that the
income of one member of the family enhances the security and increases the
tangible comforts of every member in the unit.
2 60
It is, of course, clear that a mandatory joint return involving only husband
and wife still permits tax avoidance through property transfers to a child. A
provision, therefore, similar to that once employed by Wisconsin,20 7 adding to
the rate base the income of children under eighteen who are still members of
the family unit,20 8 would seem to be desirable. But even if this provision
were not adopted, the tax privilege of residents of community property states
would be removed, and the possibility of avoiding taxation through various
p~roperty transfers would be somewhat diminished, if only by the reduction in
the number of separate tax units which can be created within a family.
A provision for mandatory joint returns would itself involve some inequity,
for where there is a working wife, income of families in the relatively low
263. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5, 13 (1937).
264. See Pavenstedt, supra note 254, at 251-52.
265. See, e.g., as to broad power of classification for tax purposes, Maxwell v. Bug-
bee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919). See also, United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498 (1937);
Helvering v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935). But see IJeiner v.
Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
266. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206 (1931).
267. Wis. STAT. (1929) § 71.05 (2) (d).
268. "If under the laws of a State the earnings of a minor belong to the minor, such
earnings, regardless of amount, are not required to be included in the return of the
parent. In the absence of proof to the contrary, a parent will be assumed to have the legal
right to the earnings of the minor and must include them in his return." U. S. Treas,
Reg. 103, § 19.51-3. When unearned income is involved, it is attributed to the minor as a
separate individual and is not included in the parent's return. 1 C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Tax
Serv. 11457.025. See Senate Hearings at 33 for statement ly Randolph E. Paul on the
inability of the Treasury "to work out a satisfactory scheme of including the income of
children in the joint return." It would appear that a procedure just the reverse of that
superficially indicated in the Treasury Regulations should be adopted-earned income
attributed to the child, unearned income to the parent. In this way any tax avoidance
arrangement would be nullified without causing undue hardship to the minor earning inde-
pendent income,
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income brackets would be diminished 2 60 by the forced use of a joint return.
This difficulty could be overcome by provision for individual returns on income
separately earned.270 Under this arrangement earned income in community
property states would be taxed to the earning individual. Thus the usual
effects of the intra-familial transfer would be avoided, yet the possibility of
undue tax discrimination against the family unit would be minimized in ac-
cordance with the ideal of an equitable tax structure.
CONCLUSION
The extended revision of the Internal Revenue Code embodied in the 1942
Act is at best a beginning in the alteration of the tax structure. Changes such
as those connected with insurance taxation, powers of appointment, excess
profits relief, pension trusts and the taxation of capital gains are merely at-
tempts to patch up the old framework. The tremendous scope of the problem
indicates the need for more basic changes. Evasion and difficulties of payment
require the adoption, as a new collection device, of virtually complete with-
holding at the source. The need for revenue and for a curb on wartime spend-
ing call for a temporary spendings tax and a forced levy through a with-
holding tax with post-war rebates. The Victory Tax should be abandoned
since the additional tax base it provides complicates the tax structure without
producing compensating advantages other than revenue increases--a function
which can be performed by raising the rates in the present system. Although
these basic changes require the most attention from Congress, the relative
minutiae of the tax system should not be forgotten. Thus inequities in the
present tax structure should be reduced by including within the scope of taxa-
tion the interest on government bonds and by adopting the mandatory joint
return.
269. This would affect families having, by virtue of the wife's earnings, a surtax net
income of over $2,000. Pub. L. No. 753, § 103.
270. See House Hearings at 10 where the suggestion was made by the Treasury that
a special allowance be made "for the earned income of the wife or the husband."
